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POST -JONES: HOW DISTRICT COURTS ARE ANSWERING 
THE MYRIAD QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE SUPREME 
COURT'S DECISION IN UNITED STATES V. JONES 
Jason D. Medinger* 
INTRODUCTION 
Much was expected. But in reality, many questions remain. When 
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in United States v. 
Jones/ the order was heralded as a harbinger of change.2 This 
speculation was fueled in large part by the groundbreaking decision 
issued below by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Maynard.3 That 
decision was hailed as "a potentially revolutionary Fourth 
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United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
See Adam Cohen, Should the Government Need a Search Warrant to Track Your Car 
with GPS?, TIME, July 5, 2011, available at http://www.time.comltime/nation/ 
article/0,8599,2081372,00.html (noting how the Jones grant "could produce one of the 
court's biggest privacy rulings in years"); Jaikumar Vijayan, Supreme Court to Weigh 
in on Warrantless GPS Tracking, COMPUTER WORLD (June 28, 2011, 12:09 PM), 
http://www.computerworld.comls/article/9217985/Supreme_Court_ to _ weigh_ in_on_ 
warrantless_ GPS_tracking (noting how the grant of certiorari held the potential for 
"far-reaching privacy implications"). 
United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd in part sub. nom. 
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). Lawrence Maynard, a co-defendant 
tried alongside Antoine Jones, was the lead appellant in the D.C. Circuit appeal. 
However, Maynard did not make any arguments on direct appeal with regard to global 
positioning system (GPS) evidence. See id. at 549. Presumably as a result, while the 
Supreme Court granted the certiorari petition of Jones, it denied the one filed by 
Maynard. Maynard v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 671 (2010). Thus, the case was 
renamed for the sole petitioner, Jones. 
Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces "Mosaic Theory" Of Fourth Amendment, Holds 
GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, (Aug. 6, 2010, 
2 :46 PM), http://www.volokh.coml20 1 0/08/06/d-c-circuit -introduces-mosaic-theory-
395 
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rethinking of how to apply Fourth Amendment privacy rights in the 
21st century."s The reason for this groundswell of enthusiasm was 
that the court in Maynard took a novel approach to the Fourth 
Amendment: it endorsed what is referred to as the "mosaic theory," 
to hold that obtaining twenty-eight days of global positioning system 
(GPS) tracking information without a warrant constituted an 
unconstitutional "search" under the Fourth Amendment because, 
when the information obtained was aggregated over a period of time, 
it impermissibly invaded the defendant's constitutional rights. 
Therefore, when the Supreme Court agreed to hear Jones, court 
commentators prognosticated that the resulting decision could deliver 
a realignment of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the area of 
advancing technologies, particularly if the Supreme Court were to 
embrace the mosaic theory in the Fourth Amendment arena.6 
It was not so. In fact, rather than breaking new constitutional 
ground, the majority opinion in Jones reverted back to a property-
law-based Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that many believed had 
been moth-balled more than forty years ago with the Court's decision 
in Katz v. United States.7 Specifically, the majority opinion in Jones 
applied a common law trespass theory, and the Supreme Court 
of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring-a-fourth-amendment-search! (noting 
how the D.C. Circuit ruling was novel because it "introduces a new 'mosaic' theory of 
the Fourth Amendment"). 
5. Charlie Savage, Judges Divided Over RiSing GPS Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 
20 I 0, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2010/08114/usI14gps.html?pagewanted 
=all; see also Orin Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, III MICH. L. 
REv. 311, 314 (2012) (noting how the mosaic theory adopted by Maynard would 
constitute "a fundamental challenge to current Fourth Amendment law"). 
6. Priscilla J. Smith et aI., When Machines Are Watching: How Warrantless Use ofGPS 
Surveillance Technology Violates the Fourth Amendment Right Against Unreasonable 
Searches, 121 YALE L.J. 177, 178-79 (2011), available at 
http://www.yalelawjoumal.orgi 2011/101111smith.htrnl; see also Lyle Denniston, 
Argument Preview: High-Tech Policing, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 5, 2011, 12:03 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.coml20 11111 largument-preview-high-tech-policing/. 
7. Hon. Kevin Emas & Tamara Pallas, United States v. Jones, Does Katz Still Have Nine 
Lives?, 24 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 116, 147 (2012) (noting how the majority in Jones 
applied a "retro-analysis of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence" that resurrected 
property-law-focused precedents); see also Erin Murphy, Back to the Future: The 
Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 325, 326-28 
(2012). For an extended discussion of the property-law underpinnings of the Fourth 
Amendment, see Nancy Forster, Back to the Future: United States v. Jones 
Resuscitates Property Law Concepts in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 42 U. 
BALT. L. REv. 445 (2013). 
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precedents relying on it, to hold that a search under the Fourth 
Amendment occurred when agents installed a GPS device on the 
undercarriage of the vehicle Antoine Jones was driving, and then 
used the device to monitor the car's movements for a period of 
twenty-eight days.8 But after reaching this narrow holding, the Court 
declined to consider whether the search was nonetheless reasonable, 
or whether some exception to the warrant requirement applied, or 
whether it would endorse the novel understanding of the Fourth 
Amendment espoused in Maynard.9 The majority opinion simply 
found that a search had occurred and affIrmed the D.C. Circuit's 
order reversing and remanding to the district court for further 
proceedings. 10 
While this holding garnered five votes, the Jones case also 
spawned two concurring opinions." In the first concurring opinion, 
Justice Sotomayor agreed that, at a minimum, a physical trespass by 
the Government to obtain information will result in a search. 12 She 
went on to suggest that Katz also still applied, and she expressed a 
willingness to expand Katz's reasonable expectation of privacy test to 
emerging technologies. 13 Additionally, in a nod to the mosaic theory 
suggested by Maynard,14 Justice Sotomayor noted her concern about 
the potential that the police could utilize new technologies to 
aggregate broad swaths of information about a person's movements, 
and thereby invade constitutionally-protected privacy interests. IS As 
a result of these concerns, she signaled openness to revisiting the 
principle that people lose a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
information is revealed to third parties, particularly when such 
disclosures are required to utilize new technologies. 16 
In the second concurring opinion, Justice Alito endorsed the view 
that Katz should control, and noted the limited reach of the majority's 
trespass-based holding in the face of new technologies. 17 But in his 
8. Jones, l32 S. Ct. at 947-49. 
9. Id. at 954. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 947, 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring), 957 (Alito, J., concurring). 
12. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
13. Id. at 955. 
14. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), ajJ'd in part sub nom. 
United States v. Jones, l32 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
15. Jones, l32 S. Ct. at 955-56 (Sotomayor, 1., concurring). 
16. Id. at 957. 
17. Id. at 959, 963-64 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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own nod to the mosaic theory suggested by Maynard, Justice Alito 
indicated that, at some point, extended surveillance may transfonn 
constitutionally-pennissible conduct into conduct that IS 
constitutionally prohibited, absent a warrant. 18 
So despite the pre-argument hype, Jones delivered a muted result; 
at bottom, all the Justices concurred in the narrow holding that a 
Fourth Amendment search occurred on the facts of this case. 19 But 
roiling below the surface of this unanimity lie the many questions left 
open by the majority opinion and the two concurrences. These 
questions can be subdivided into three main categories. 
First, what does Jones mean in the context of warrantless GPS 
tracking going forward? Specifically, even if the warrantless 
installation of a GPS device constitutes a search, could it nonetheless 
still be considered "reasonable" under certain circumstances, and 
hence permissible under the Fourth Amendment?2o Even if the 
warrantless use of GPS tracking is an unreasonable search, do any 
exceptions to the warrant requirement apply? Do traditional Fourth 
Amendment standing requirements still apply to GPS-related 
evidence? Finally, does Jones apply retroactively to cases on direct 
appeal or collateral review? 
The second category of questions raised by Jones concerns what 
implications the decision may have for other modem technologies. 
Does the property-law-based theory of Fourth Amendment searches 
extend beyond the context of GPS tracking into, for example, e-
mails, cell phone communications, text messages, or social media 
po stings? Relatedly, does the third-party disclosure doctrine still 
control where these media are concerned? 
Third, Jones raises fundamental questions about Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in the face of emerging technologies. 
Specifically, is the combined property-law-based test and Katz test 
approach endorsed by the majority sufficient to protect individual 
privacy in this modem age? Must the legislature take the lead in 
regulating police conduct in this area? 
18. Jd. at 964. 
19. Id. at 949 (majority opinion) (holding that there was a search); id. at 954 (Sotomayor, 
J., concurring) (concurring that a search occurred); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) 
(agreeing that a search occurred). 
20. See id. at 954 (declining to consider whether the search was reasonable because the 
argument had been forfeited). 
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Because Jones raises these questions but leaves them unanswered, 
the onus now falls to district courts to fill some of the void. Since 
Jones was decided, lower courts are deciding many of these issues in 
the first instance, with interesting results. 21 Specifically, rather than 
breaking wholly new constitutional ground, district courts are relying 
on long-established precedents in a manner that largely preserves 
much of the status quO.22 For example, while the Supreme Court held 
in Jones that GPS tracking constituted a search, lower courts have 
avoided excluding such evidence by holding that such a search could 
be nonetheless reasonable if it is limited,23 or by holding that an 
exception to the warrant requirement applies/4 or by holding that 
such evidence falls within the third-party disclosure doctrine.25 In 
short, while Jones was hailed as being a potentially watershed 
moment in Fourth Amendment history, district courts applying its 
holding have reacted with caution and proceeded in a manner that 
does not upset long-established understandings of the Fourth 
Amendment. 26 
This article is focused on how district courts are addressing the 
myriad questions raised by Jones. To set the stage for understanding 
the context in which these decisions are being made, Part I of this 
article includes a brief overview of the history of the Fourth 
Amendment and the relevant decisions leading up to Jones. Part II 
provides a brief explication of the holding in Jones, and examines the 
questions raised by the majority opinion and the concurrences. 
Finally, Part III examines how the district courts are dealing with the 
questions created-and left unanswered-by Jones, and suggests 
how these questions can be answered in light of prior precedent and 
amidst emerging and evolving technologies. 
21. See infra Part lILA-B. 
22. See infra Part III.A-B. 
23. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text. 
24. See infra Part I1I.A. 
25. See infra notes 343-45 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra Part lILA-B. 
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I. MAPPING27 THE PAST: RECOUNTING THE HISTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF FOURTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Fourth Amendment provides that: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized.28 
When the Court in Jones construed this proVISIon, it had at its 
disposal a long, and admittedly sometimes inconsistent,29 line of 
precedents to consider. Because Jones proved correct the maxim that 
past is prologue,30 it is helpful to trace briefly the history of the 
Fourth Amendment,31 with an eye toward the important developments 
that shaped how the Court viewed its application to warrantless 
tracking methods. 
27. Mapping is perhaps the earliest form of tracking data about one's historical location. 
Not unlike modem historical GPS data, maps depicted where the cartographer had 
been at a time in the past. The earliest known map dates back to 2300 B.c., and was 
excavated from the ruined Mesopotamian city Ga-Sur at Nuzi, which is in present-day 
Iraq. 100 MAPS: THE SCIENCE, ART AND POLITICS OF CARTOGRAPHY THROUGHOUT 
HISTORY 18 (John O. E. Clark ed., 2005). 
28. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
29. See Kyllo v. United States, 534 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (noting how Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has been criticized as "unpredictable"); Chapman v. United States, 365 
U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (noting how the course of Fourth 
Amendment precedents has not been "smooth"). 
30. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST, act 2, sc. I, II. 285-90 (Wash. Square Press 
New Folger Ed. 2004) ("The man i' th' moon's too slow-till newborn chins [b]e 
rough and razorable; she that from whom [w]e all were sea-swallowed, though some 
cast again, And by that destiny to perform an act [w]hereof what's past is prologue, 
what to come, [i]n yours and my discharge."). 
31. By no means do I intend this article to provide a comprehensive history of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence; that would take a tome. I simply provide a brief primer 
here to put later decisions by the Supreme Court and district courts into greater 
context. 
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A. 1700-1791: The Origins of the Fourth Amendment 
The legislative history detailing the Framers' precise understanding 
of, and motivation behind, the Fourth Amendment is sparse.32 The 
initial draft of the amendment was prepared by James Madison, and 
sent to the House of Representatives for consideration in a form not 
dissimilar from the current text. 33 Madison's draft amendment 
thereafter received slight wordsmithing by the Committee of 
Eleven,34 and then by Representative Egert Benson of New York.35 It 
was subsequently adopted by both Houses of Congress and ratified 
by the States in its current form.36 
Despite the scarcity of legislative history, however, judges and 
scholars have attempted to divine the original intent from several 
sources available to the Framers prior to the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights, including: (1) precedents from English and colonial courts; 
32. Akhil Reed Amar, Terry and Fourth Amendment First Principles, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. 
REv. 1097, 1106 (1998) (noting that "no Framer ever said that this is what the 
Amendment did or should mean"); Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and 
Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-
and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1371 & n.34 (1983) ("The actual 
'legislative history' of the fourth amendment reveals little about the intended scope of 
its protections .... "). This conclusion is buttressed by the leading scholarly treatises, 
which analyze the historical origins of the Fourth Amendment. See WILLIAM J. 
CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING 602-1791, at 
669-72, 691-98, 704-08 (2009); JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND 
THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 39-43 (1966); 
NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51, 65-102 (1970). 
33. Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized Suspicion in Assessing the 
Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 483, 514-15 (1995). 
The original draft of the amendment read as follows: 
The rights of the people to be secured in their persons, their 
houses, their papers, and their other property, from all 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated by 
warrants issued without probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, or not particularly describing the places to be 
searched, or the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 434-35 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834». 
34. Id. at 516. For reasons that are not clear, the Committee of Eleven reported a draft of 
the amendment to the full House that omitted that phrase "unreasonable searches and 
seizures." Id. (citing LANDYNSKI, supra note 32, at 41; LASSON, supra note 32, at 
101). 
35. Id. Benson is credited with changing the phrase "by warrants issuing" to "and no 
warrant shall issue." Id. 
36. Id. at 516-17. 
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(2) various state constitutional documents; and (3) the state 
ratification debates. 37 Based on these sources, the Fourth 
Amendment is commonly understood as an attempt to break from the 
past abuses associated with the use of general warrants38 and writs of 
assistance39 by the British Crown, and to provide a safeguard against 
unreasonable government trespasses into a person's home or property 
interests.4o And as will be seen below, these roots are important to 
the precedents leading up to Jones and the result in the Jones decision 
itself.41 
The legal precedents that presaged the adoption of the Fourth 
Amendment concerned civil cases brought by persons aggrieved by 
trespassory searches executed by government agents on the authority 
of general warrants and writs of assistance.42 The first major step 
toward change actually came in a case where the plaintiffs lost, and 
the writs of assistance prevailed.43 In 1760, in Boston, after the then-
existing writs of assistance expired, agents of the Crown applied for 
renewed writs to continue the practice of unfettered searches of 
property belonging to the colonists by customs officers.44 The 
37. Stewart, supra note 32, at 1369-71; see also LANDYNSKl, supra note 32, at 39--40. 
38. General warrants were a tool used by law enforcement in Great Britain throughout 
much of the 1700's. Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 353-54 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing 
LASSON, supra note 32, at 24--42). They empowered their holders to "'seize, take 
hold and bum ... books, and things ... offensive to the state,'" all without any 
showing of probable cause or suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. Stewart, supra note 
32, at 1369 (quoting LANDYNSKl, supra note 32, at 21). These general warrants were 
principally aimed at suppressing speech deemed libelous against the British Crown. 
Id. 
39. Writs of assistance used means similar to those used to execute general warrants, but 
they were employed to combat a different problem: tax evasion, particularly by 
inhabitants of the British colonies. Stewart, supra note 32, at 1370. Specifically, 
writs of assistance gave British customs inspectors unlimited power to search 
anywhere at their discretion to ferret out attempts to smuggle goods into or out of the 
colonies without paying the Crown's onerous taxes. Id. 
40. Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searchingfor History, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1707, 1726-27 (1996) (reviewing CUDDllIY, supra note 32); see also Arizona v. 
Evans, 514 U.S. 1,23 (1995) ("The use of general warrants to search for evidence of 
violations of the Crown's revenue laws understandably outraged the authors of the 
Bill of Rights."); Stewart, supra note 32, at 1369-70 (citing LANDYNSKl, supra note 
32, at 30--48; LASSON, supra note 32, at 51-105). 
41. See infra notes 42-59 and accompanying text; infra Part LB. 
42. Stewart, supra note 32, at 1369-70. 
43. Id. at 1370--71. 
44. Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers' Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 8600. L.J. 979, 991-92 (2011). 
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colonists retained James Otis to present their case challenging the 
new writS.45 The main question presented before the Court in this 
Writs of Assistance Case46 was whether the Court should permit 
unconditional writs of indefmite duration, or whether they must be 
tied to a specific instance, for a search of a specific place, based on 
information specified under oath.47 And while the colonists 
ultimately lost their case, the arguments raised by Otis-which were 
steeped in dire warnings about government agents having the ability 
"to enter forceably into a dwelling house, and rifle every part of 
it'>48-had profound influence on John Adams, a key Framer, and 
other colonists who would later seek independence from the British.49 
Similar battles were being fought across the pond over the use of 
general warrants. For example, in Wilkes v. Wood,50 John Wilkes 
brought suit over the general warrant issued by the British Secretary 
of State, Lord Halifax, authorizing four Crown messengers to search 
for the printers and publishers of the "seditious" publication, The 
North Briton, No. 45.51 Because the warrant did not specify the 
particular persons to be seized or the places to be searched, those 
executing the warrant ended up arresting forty-nine people over a 
three-day period and confiscating vast quantities of their private 
papers.52 In awarding damages to Wilkes for the trespass, the English 
court found the warrant to be "hopelessly defective" because it lacked 
the "offenders' names" or an inventory of what was to be taken 
away.53 The court concluded that the use of the warrant here was 
"totally subversive of the liberty of the subject [Wilkes].,,54 
45. Id. at 992. 
46. This case is also referred to as the Paxton Case. Id. at 992 n.79. 
47. Id. at 992. 
48. Id. at 993-94. 
49. Id. at 1004-05; see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886) (quoting 
John Adams' observation that Otis' oration was "the fIrst act of opposition" to the 
British Crown and that "[t]hen and there the child of Independence was born"); 
Stewart, supra note 32, at 1370-71 (citing LASSON, supra note 32, at 51). 
50. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.). 
51. Stewart, supra note 32, at 1369-70. 
52. Id. at 1369; Scott E. Sundby, Protecting the Citizen "Whilst He Is Quiet": 
Suspicionless Searches, "Special Needs" And General Warrants, 74 MISS. LJ. 501, 
506 (2004) (recounting the Wilkes case). 
53. Sundby, supra note 52, at 506. 
54. Id. 
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The English Courts reached a similar result shortly thereafter in 
Entick v. Carrington. 55 In that decision, the court was again called on 
to decide an action for trespass by the victim of a general warrant.56 
Specifically, Crown messengers entered the plaintiffs house and 
broke open his desks and boxes in a search for his private papers in 
an effort to fmd "seditious" materials. 57 In rendering a verdict for the 
plaintiff, the court again recognized that property law rendered the 
home sacrosanct, and that any trespasser therein would be liable in 
damages.58 Importantly, however, Entick made the simple 
observation that, absent a physical trespass, observation of things in 
public view would not result in liability because "the eye cannot by 
the laws of England be guilty oftrespass.,,59 
Following these decisions and others, in 1766, the British House of 
Commons voted to outlaw the use of general warrants in libel 
investigations.60 These developments were known to the Framers 
when they later proposed the Fourth Amendment and influenced their 
legislative actions.61 
But the Framers had more than simple legal precedents upon which 
to rely when they were debating the Fourth Amendment. The basic 
tenets of the Fourth Amendment were already enshrined in many 
state constitutional documents that provided protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.62 As these provisions make 
clear, the drafters of these protections were still concerned with 
55. Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1029. 
56. Id. at 1030, 1038. 
57. Id. at 1038. 
58. Entick, 95 Eng. Rep. at 817 ("[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, 
that no man can set his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave; if he does he 
is a trespasser, though he does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his neighbour's 
ground, he must justify it by law. "). 
59. Entick, 19 How. St. Tr. at 1066. 
60. Eric Schnapper, Unreasonable Searches and Seizures of Papers, 71 VA. L. REv. 869, 
909-10 (1985); George C. Thomas, III, Stumbling Toward History: The Framers' 
Search and Seizure World, 43 TEX. TECH L. REv. 199,214 (2010). 
61. Boyd v. United States, 166 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886); Clancy, supra note 44, at 1055 
n.442 (recounting how Justice Story concluded that the Framers were influenced by 
the cases emanating from the abuses of writs of assistance and general warrants); 
Thomas Y. Davies, Can You Handle the Truth? The Framers Preserved Common-
Law Criminal Arrest and Search Rules in "Due Process of Law"-Fourth 
Amendment Reasonableness" Is Only a Modem, Destructive, Judicial Myth, 43 TEX. 
TECH L. REv. 51, 108 (2010); Stewart, supra note 32, at 1371. 
62. Stewart, supra note 32, at 1371. 
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curbing the abuse of general warrants. For example, the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights of 1776 provided that 
general warrants, whereby any officer or messenger may be 
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of 
a fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not 
named, or whose offense is not particularly described and 
supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive and 
ought not to be granted.63 
The constitutions of Maryland, Delaware, North Carolina, and 
Pennsylvania provided similar protections.64 But more than reacting 
to the abuses associated with general warrants, these provisions also 
safeguarded the right to be "secure" in one's house and in one's 
property.65 These state constitutional provisions provided models for 
the Framers when they were drafting the Fourth Amendment.66 
But in addition to the groundbreaking legal precedents and the state 
constitutional forerunners to the Fourth Amendment, scholars have 
also traced the original intent of the Fourth Amendment from the 
state ratification debates.67 Research into these sources shows the 
Framers were still concerned about trespassory searches, but also 
searches unbounded by any sense of reason or restraint. 68 For 
example, in the Virginia debates, Patrick Henry warned against the 
specter of government intrusion into homes and argued that "unless 
the general government be restrained by a bill of rights, or some 
similar restriction, [government agents could] go into your cellars and 
rooms, and measure everything you eat, drink, or wear. They ought 
to be restrained within proper bounds.,,69 Likewise, during the 
Maryland debates, concern was raised about whether "an officer of 
63. VA. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 10. 
64. DEL. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 17; MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 
23; N.C. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. 11; PA. CONST. DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS, art. 10. 
65. Clancy, supra note 44, at 1028, 1038. 
66. ld. at 1046-47; see also Stewart, supra note 32, at 137l. 
67. James Leonard, Note, Oliver v. United States: The Open Fields Doctrine Survives 
Katz, N.C. L. REv. 546, 549 n.25 (1984-1985). 
68. Clancy, supra note 44, at 1032-33. 
69. Leonard, supra note 67, at 549 n.25. 
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the United States should force [his way into] the house, the asylum of 
a citizen," without any check of reasonableness and restraint. 70 
So while the express legislative history behind the Fourth 
Amendment may be scant, these primary sources do provide some 
basis upon which to draw inferences about the purpose behind the 
Amendment. Specifically, these early sources show that the Framers 
considered the home to be sacrosanct and something to be protected 
against government intrusions, a concept that was buttressed by the 
common law theory of trespass. 71 In addition, the Framers were 
concerned about the overreach associated with general warrants, and 
strived to ensure some level of specificity of the person and place to 
be searched.72 Finally, the Framers recognized the need for law 
enforcement to engage in searches to ferret out wrongdoing, provided 
those searches were kept within the bounds ofreasonableness.73 
B. 1791-1967: Early Fourth Amendment Case Law Adopts 
Property-Law-Based Paradigm 
Following the Fourth Amendment's ratification in 1791, there were 
relatively few early court decisions construing its meaning. 74 
Scholars speculate that this largely has to do with the fact that the 
Fourth Amendment originally only applied to the federal government 
and not the states,15 and the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction in 
the early years of the Republic was much narrower than it is today. 76 
But the few cases to reach the Fourth Amendment hewed closely to 
the property-law-based precepts that motivated the Framers. 
The first major construction of the Fourth Amendment by the 
Supreme Court came in Boyd v. United States, a case involving, 
70. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARv. L. REv. 757, 777 
(1994). 
71. See Clancy, supra note 44, at 1058. 
72. ld. at 1045-47. 
73. See id. at 996-97 (noting how even Otis in the Writs of Assistance case argued that 
"[f]or flagrant Crimes, and in Cases of great public Necessity, the Priviledge [sic] may 
be incrohd [encroached] on" by execution ofa special warrant). 
74. Davies, supra note 61, at 108. 
75. Jd. at 108-09. The Supreme Court did not hold the Fourth Amendment as 
incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the States until 1949. 
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949), overruled on other grounds by 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
76. Davies, supra note 61, at 109. 
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ironically,77 violations of customs laws.78 In that case, federal 
officers suspected certain goods had been improperly imported. 79 
Relying on a federal statute that permitted the U.S. Attorney to apply 
for a court order mandating that certain books and papers be turned 
over to the court for potential use as evidence, the district court 
ordered the defendants to produce invoices that were used as 
evidence against them in trial. 80 The Supreme Court held that the 
district court's order violated the Fourth Amendment on the grounds 
that it mandated an "invasion of [the defendants'] indefeasible 
right[s] of personal security, personal liberty, and private property.,,81 
The next major Fourth Amendment opinion came in 1914 in Weeks 
v. United States.82 In that case, police officers found a spare key to 
the defendant's home, entered when he was not there, and searched 
his papers in order to find evidence he was using the mail to promote 
an illegal gambling enterprise.83 Over the defendant's objection on 
Fourth and Fifth Amendment grounds, the district court permitted the 
prosecution to introduce evidence of various lottery tickets and 
correspondence that had been obtained during the search and related 
to the illegal lottery scheme.84 The Court recognized that the police 
have the right to make searches incident to legal arrests, and thereby 
have the right to "discover and seize the fruits or evidences of 
crime.,,85 However, with regard to what happened here, the Court 
recognized "that a man's house was his castle, and not to be invaded 
by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.,,86 
Because the police's trespass violated the sanctity of the defendant's 
home, the Court reversed and ordered a new trial. 87 
77. The facts are ironic given that, as detailed above, one of the motivations behind the 
adoption of the Fourth Amendment was the fact that the British customs agents 
abused writs of assistance to inspect and seize goods that were allegedly imported in 
violation of customs laws. See supra notes 37-49 and accompanying text. 
78. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 617-18 (1886). 
79. !d. 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 630. 
82. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
83. Id. at 386. 
84. Id. at 388-89. 
85. Id. at 392. 
86. Id. at 390. 
87. Id. at 398. 
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The culmination of this property-law-based view of the Fourth 
Amendment, and the first major Supreme Court case to deal with the 
application of the Fourth Amendment to emerging communication 
technologies, was Olmstead v. United States.88 At issue in Olmstead 
was whether the police had violated the Fourth Amendment by 
intercepting private telephone conversations through the use of 
wiretaps.89 The federal officers investigating the defendants had 
reason to believe they were involved in a large bootlegging 
conspiracy to sell prohibited liquors.9o To further their investigation, 
the federal officers tapped the phones of four of the conspirators by 
installing small wires onto the ordinary telephone wires outside of the 
homes of these conspirators.91 The Court upheld the convictions, 
principally because "[t]here was no entry of the houses or offices of 
the defendants."92 The Court reasoned that the telephone wires were 
no more a part of the homes of the defendants than the public 
highways.93 But also underlying the Court's decision was the fact 
that the signals that were actually intercepted did not constitute the 
kind of "material thing" that the Fourth Amendment covered.94 
Finally, undergirding the Court's rationale was that the defendants 
had chosen to use the technology of the phone to amplify their voices 
outside their homes, and hence were exposing their incriminating 
statements to anyone in the world who could hear them.95 The Court 
concluded that Congress could pass legislation providing further 
protections in this area;96 but as for the Fourth Amendment, it simply 
did not reach so far.97 
While the decision in Olmstead was a high-water mark for the 
property-law-based understanding of the Fourth Amendment, it was 
88. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,455 (1928). 
89. Jd. 
90. Jd. at 455-56. 
91. Jd. at 456-57. 
92. Jd. at 464. 
93. Jd. at 465. 
94. Jd. at 464. 
95. Jd. at 466 ("The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone 
instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, 
and that the wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, are not 
within the protection of the Fourth Amendment."). 
96. Jd. at 465-66. 
97. Jd. at 466. 
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not unanimous.98 Specifically, in one of several dissents, Justice 
Brandeis postulated a theory of the Fourth Amendment that reached 
beyond the property-law-focused strictures of past precedents.99 He 
argued that the Framers meant to protect not just people's material 
things, but also "their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their 
sensations."lOo Recognizing this, and that advancing technologies 
allow the government to exercise "[s]ubtler and more far-reaching 
means of invading privacy," Justice Brandeis would have reversed 
the convictions. lol This dissent is significant because it would lay the 
groundwork for the Court's later, more expansive interpretation of 
what the Fourth Amendment protects. 102 
In addition to not being unanimous, Justice Taft's majority in 
Olmstead also was not the last word on the issue of wiretapping of 
telephone communications. lo3 Specifically, just six years after the 
decision, Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of 
1934,104 which outlawed wiretapping. 105 And this is notable because 
it would not be the last time that Congress legislated in an area of 
technology that the Court held was not protected by the Fourth 
Amendment. 106 
Thus, while trespass theory won the day in Olmstead, and indeed 
prevailed in remaining good law for another thirty years,107 these 
98. See id. at 475-76 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
99. Jd. at 478. 
100. Jd. 
101. Jd. at 473, 479. 
102. Amy L. Peikoff, Pragmatism and Privacy, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 638, 645 (2010); 
see also Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two 
Creation Stories of the Exclusionary Rule, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 391, 402-03 (2010). 
103. See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: 
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801 (2004) 
(analyzing the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence of wiretapping). 
104. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 223 (1934). 
105. See Alexander Scolnik, Note, Protections for Electronic Communications: The Stored 
Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 349, 363 
n.117 (2009); see also Robert A. Pikowski, An Overview of the Law of Electronic 
Surveillance Post September 11, 2011, 94 LAW LIBR. J. 601, 603 (2002). 
106. See Scolnik, supra note 105, at 372. 
107. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961) (holding that police's use of 
"spike mike" inserted from an adjoining row house onto the wall of the defendant's 
home constituted a Fourth Amendment violation because "the eavesdropping was 
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises 
occupied by the petitioners"); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1942) 
(holding that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred when agents held a 
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ancillary developments-Brandeis' dissent and the legislative 
response-would lay the groundwork for the next evolution of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence in the coming decades.108 
C. 1967-2011: Katz Ushers in a Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
Based on Reasonable Expectations of Privacy 
The Supreme Court's 1967 opinion in Katz v. United States 
represented a sea change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 109 In 
Katz, the defendant was convicted of transmitting illegal wagering 
information using a public telephone. 110 The key pieces of evidence 
were recordings of the defendant's own telephone conversations, 
which FBI agents accessed by attaching an electronic listening and 
recording device to the outside of the public telephone booth that the 
defendant used to relay the bets. III The Court started its analysis by 
jettisoning the notion that the Fourth Amendment protected only 
specific "constitutionally protected area[ s ]"; 112 rather, the Court held 
that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.,,113 Then, 
the Court rejected the notion that, absent a trespass, there can be no 
Fourth Amendment violation, and seemingly overruled Olmstead and 
its property-law-based progeny. I 14 The Court held that the 
"Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording 
the [defendant's] words violated the privacy upon which he 
justifiably relied" while in the closed phone booth.115 In reaching this 
decision, the Court noted "the vital role that the public telephone has 
come to play in private communication.,,116 Finally, the Court held 
detectaphone device up to a wall to hear what was happening within because "use of 
the detectaphone was not made illegal by trespass or unlawful entry"}. 
108. See supra notes 99-102, 105-D6 and accompanying text. 
109. See 389 U.S. 347 (1967); infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text. 
110. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
Ill. Id. 
112. Id.at350-51. 
113. Id. at 351. 
114. Jd. at 353 ("Thus, although a closely divided Court supposed in Olmstead that 
surveillance without any trespass and without the seizure of any material object fell 
outside the ambit of the Constitution, we have since departed from the narrow view on 
which that decision rested."). 
115. Id. 
116. Id. at 352. 
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that such a warrantless search was "per se unreasonable," and that no 
exception to the warrant requirement applied. 117 
While the decision was 7-1, Justice Harlan wrote a concurring 
opinion that was later adopted as reflecting the reorientation and 
enlargement of the protections of the Fourth Amendment that the 
Court recognized in Katz. I 18 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan held 
that the Court would recognize a search occurred under the Fourth 
Amendment if two conditions were met: "flrst that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, 
that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
'reasonable. ",119 It is this formulation that is commonly referred to as 
"the Katz test.,,120 
The Katz decision was a watershed moment for a variety of 
reasons. Principally, by reorienting the analysis away from a 
trespassory theory, the Court opened up broad new swaths of territory 
where the Fourth Amendment could provide protections, including 
new technologies. 121 But the decision also raised a number of new 
ways in which individuals could cede Fourth Amendment protections 
by exposing their conduct to the world in a manner that society would 
not reasonably afford privacy protections. 122 In other words, even if 
strict property law theories might have provided protections in the 
past, the use of new technologies might not be protected if common 
usage or the particular characteristics of the device might not be 
considered sufflciently "private" by "society.,,123 A number of 
decisions in the aftermath of Katz attempted to sort out these new 
117. Id. at 357-58. 
118. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining 
that the established Katz test "has come to mean the test enunciated by Justice 
Harlan's separate concurrence in Katz"); Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up in 
Knotts? GPS Technology and the Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L. REv. 409, 427 
(2007) ("In subsequent cases, the Court has adopted Justice Harlan's two-pronged 
formulation of Fourth Amendment application as the standard analysis for 
determining whether or not a search has occurred."). 
119. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
120. Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test, 
40 MCGEORGE L. REv. I, 6-7 (2009). 
121. Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made oj?, 41 
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 781,789-90 (2008). 
122. See id. at 790. 
123. See id. 
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boundaries, and in the process created several new contours to the 
Fourth Amendment. 124 
For example, the Supreme Court established125 the third-party 
doctrine post-Katz on the theory that information revealed to a third 
party loses Fourth Amendment protections, thereby allowing the 
Government to acquire the infonnation from the third-party without a 
warrant. 126 This rule was exemplified in the case of United States v. 
Miller. 127 In that case, the defendant, a bootlegger, challenged the 
federal prosecutor's use of subpoenas to his bank to obtain bank 
records. 128 Building off of its prior precedent that a defendant had no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in voluntary communications with 
an undercover informant,129 the Court held that, by sharing the 
fmancial information with a third party, the defendant had assumed 
the risk it would be turned over to the government. 130 Importantly, 
the Court held that the third-party doctrine would apply "even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for 
a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not 
be betrayed.,,131 Miller thus represented an early application of the 
Katz reasonable expectation test, and in it the Court concluded that 
124. Aside from spawning new case law, the decision in Katz also spurred legislative 
action in the area of wiretaps. For example, Congress passed Title III of the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.c. § 2510 (2006). United States 
v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962-63 (2012); Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, 
Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of 
Age, 97 MINN. L. REv. 407, 488 & n.449 (2012). 
125. Perhaps it is more accurate to say the Court reaffirmed the doctrine post-Katz. This is 
because the Court had previously ruled that one's use of the telephone wires had the 
result of amplifying his voice to the outside world and thus any Fourth Amendment 
protections were lost. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
Likewise, when a person's voice was so loud that it could be heard through a spike 
mike on.the adjoining wall, no Fourth Amendment protections inured. Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-10 (1961). These could be construed as early 
precursors to the third-party doctrine. 
126. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 438-39. 
129. See id. at 440 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1966». 
130. Id. at 442-43. 
131. Id. at 443. 
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society would not recognize as reasonable a defendant's claim to a 
privacy interest in information voluntarily shared with a third party. 132 
In addition, the Court established the Fourth Amendment standing 
doctrine.133 Specifically, in Rakas v. Illinois,134 the Court rejected a 
Fourth Amendment challenge to a warrantless search by passengers 
in a car on the theory that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and 
cannot be asserted vicariously.135 The Court held that because the 
passengers in the car had neither a property nor a possessory interest 
in the vehicle, they could not claim their Fourth Amendment rights 
were violated when the car was searched and the officer found a 
shotgun. 136 This decision thus applied the Katz reasonable 
expectation test, and concluded that society would not deem 
passengers to have a reasonable expectation of privacy when 
traveling in someone else's car. 137 
Finally, the Court established the open fields doctrine, which 
provides that there is no expectation of privacy in the open fields 
away from the curtilage of one's home. 138 While this doctrine could 
be seen as a corollary to the third-party doctrine (i.e., that people 
essentially share with the world what can be viewed in open fields 
because they have not taken steps to shield all views), it is significant 
because it permitted a technical trespass onto lands without a Fourth 
Amendment violation. 139 The doctrine was developed140 in the case 
of Oliver v. United States. 141 In that case, state police trespassed onto 
132. Id. at 442-44; see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,745-46 (1979) (holding that 
the installation of pen register did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the 
caller was exposing to the phone company the numbers he was dialing). 
133. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1978). 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 130, 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)). 
136. Id. at 148. 
137. See id. at 148-49. 
138. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984). 
139. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979) (stating that the Court has 
consistently held that "a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information he voluntarily turns over to third parties"), with Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177-
79 (holding that the expectation of privacy in open fields is not an expectation that 
society recognizes as reasonable, and thus, government intrusion upon such open 
fields does not constitute an unreasonable search). 
140. Again, it may be more accurate to say that the Court was simply reaffirming the open 
fields doctrine in this case because it had previously recognized that law enforcement 
could enter open fields without violating the Constitution in Court in Hester v. United 
States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
141. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178. 
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the defendant's lands and eventually came upon a field of marijuana 
nearly a mile from the defendant's home. 142 In holding that no Fourth 
Amendment violation occurred, the Court applied Katz and held that 
"an individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities 
conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately 
surrounding the home.,,143 
Based on the establishment of these basic principles in the 
application of the Katz test, the Supreme Court went on to reach 
decisions in several areas involving new technologies. l44 First, in 
perhaps the most low-tech example, the Court in Texas v. Brown held 
that a police officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of a 
driver of a car when he used a flashlight to illuminate the inside of 
the vehicle and found contraband.145 Applying a corollary to the open 
fields and third-party doctrines, the plain view exception, the Court 
held that the officer simply used "artificial" means to enhance his 
view of what the defendant was already displaying to the public, and 
hence there could be no reasonable expectation of privacy. 146 
The second category of cases applying post-Katz rules involved the 
use of beepers that emit a signal to track the beeper's movements. 147 
In United States v. Knotts,148 in an effort to track the movements of a 
suspected manufacturer of illicit drugs, the police attached a beeper 
to a container of chemicals with the consent of the vendor, and the 
container was then sold to the defendant. 149 In analyzing the 
information that the police obtained, the Court recognized that the 
beeper simply gave the police information about where the defendant 
142. Id. at 173. 
143. Id. at 177-78. 
144. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 708, 712 (1984) (holding that the 
Government did not engage in a search by placing a beeper into a can of ether that 
was later sold to the defendant and used to track his whereabouts); Texas v. Brown, 
460 U.S. 731, 739-40 (1983) (discussing the applicability of the plain view doctrine 
when an officer is aided by a flashlight); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277, 
281 (1983) (discussing one's expectation of privacy while traveling on public roads in 
the context of a beeper being placed within a container of chloroform, which law 
enforcement officials then tracked to respondent's secluded cabin). 
145. Brown, 460 U.S. at 739-40. 
146. ld. 
147. Daniel T. Pesciotta, Note, I'm Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment 
in the 21st Century, 63 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 187,203 (2012). 
148. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
149. 1d. at 278. 
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was while on public roads. ISO And so again applying a principle akin 
to the third-party doctrine, the Court found no search had occurred 
under Katz because "[a] person travelling in an automobile on public 
thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
movements from one place to another.,,151 But as the Court found the 
following year in United States v. Karo,152 this beeper technology 
could not be used to monitor what was going on inside a dwelling 
because that would give the police "information that it could not have 
obtained by observation from outside the curtilage of the house.,,153 
In the next major case to test the breadth of Katz where new 
technologies were involved, the Court was called on again to revisit 
and reaffirm the open fields and the third-party doctrines. 154 In 
California v. Ciraolo, ISS the Court confronted whether the police 
violated the defendant's rights when they used a helicopter to conduct 
aerial surveillance and saw from 1,000 feet in the air that the 
defendant was growing marijuana in his backyard behind large 
fences. 156 In ruling against the defendant, the Court reaffirmed the 
notion that the police do not conduct a search when they simply view 
what a person exposes to the public, even if some effort must be 
undertaken to see what is revealed. 157 In addition, the Court noted 
that air travel was routine and that this vitiated any expectation that 
one's backyard would never be exposed to aerial surveillance. ISS 
The next major technologically advanced Fourth Amendment case 
was Kyllo v. United States. 159 In that case, agents from the 
Department of the Interior, while sitting in their car on the street, 
used a thermal imaging device to scan the outside of the home of a 
suspected manufacturer of marijuana. 160 After the imager reported 
elevated levels of heat being given off, which suggested a high-power 
grow-light was being used, the agents obtained a warrant to the 
150. Id. at 281. 
151. Id. 
152. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984). 
153. Jd. at 714-15; see also id. at 712 (noting that "[ilt is the exploitation of technological 
advances that implicates the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence"). 
154. See Pesciotta, supra note 147, at 206. 
155. California v. Ciraol0, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
156. Id. at 209. 
157. Id. at 213. 
158. Id. at 215. 
159. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
160. Jd. at 29-30. 
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search the home, which yielded evidence of the indoor marijuana 
growing operation. 161 In reversing the defendant's conditional guilty 
plea, the Supreme Court held that the agents obtained information 
about the interior of the home through artificial means not in use by 
the general public, and hence a Fourth Amendment search had 
occurred. 162 In reaching this decision, the Court shucked off the 
notion that the imager was simply recording what the inhabitants 
inside the home were exposing to the public. 163 Thus, while the Court 
recognized that "the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the 
Fourth Amendment" may be affected by the "advance of 
technology,"l64 pursuant to Karo (and perhaps even also Boyd and 
Weeks) it would still constitute a Fourth Amendment violation if 
agents used technology to accomplish a "virtual" trespass to learn 
information about what is going on inside the home. 165 
Finally, the most recent post-Katz but pre-Jones case involving 
emerging technologies was Ontario v. Quon.166 Rather than arising in 
the context of a criminal investigation, this case involved a challenge 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by a police officer who was 
disciplined after his supervisors reviewed the contents of his text 
messages sent over a work-issued pager and found he sent a large 
volume of non-work-related text messages. 167 Using the Fourth 
Amendment test applicable when the government acts in its capacity 
as an employer and not as a criminal investigator, the Court held that 
the search was reasonable because it was related to a legitimate work 
purpose and it was not excessive in scope. 168 But the opinion is more 
notable for what it did not decide. Specifically, the Court simply 
assumed that the officer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his text messages, without reaching a holding on that question. 169 But 
the Court provided fascinating guideposts for the relevant inquiry 
into whether an individual has a reasonable expectation in the use of 
a new technology, including whether the use of the technology is 
161. ld. at 30. 
162. ld. at 34-35. 
163. ld. at 35-36. 
164. ld. at 33-34. 
165. See id. at 34. 
166. Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010). 
167. ld. at 2625-26. 
168. ld. at 2632-33. 
169. ld. at 2630. 
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essential to modem living, whether the technology is ubiquitous and 
able to be personally owned, and whether there are stated policies ex 
ante about the privacy expectations in the use of the technology.170 
But while the Court raised these issues, it left deciding them for 
another day, particularly because the ramifications of these emerging 
technologies were not yet fully understood. 171 
In sum, in the aftermath of Katz, the Supreme Court confronted 
new questions involving the application of the Fourth Amendment to 
new technologies. And while some critics suggest the post-Katz 
jurisprudence is "subjective and unpredictable,,,172 a few guiding 
principles emerge. It is certainly permissible for the police to observe 
what is in plain view173 and revealed to third parties. 174 The police 
may even use artificial aids and new technologies to enhance their 
sensory perception. 175 But the home is still sacrosanct, and it is a 
search when new technologies that are not routinely used by ordinary 
citizens are utilized by the police to accomplish an electronic or 
virtual trespass into the confines of the home. 176 Pre-Jones, these 
guiding lights were generally accepted as the reigning Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. But the Court's decision in Jones signals, 
perhaps, another evolution. 
II. PINGING177 THE PRESENT: EXAMINING THE DECISION 
IN UNITED STATES V. JONES 
Starting in 2004, the police suspected that Antoine Jones, an owner 
of a D.C. nightclub, was involved in a narcotics trafficking 
170. Id. 
171. Id. 
172. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (citing critical sources). 
173. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133-37 (1990). 
174. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
175. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 
739-40 (1983). 
176. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34-35; United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714-15 (1984). 
177. "Pinging" refers to when a cell phone company sends a signal to a cellphone to 
determine its location. See Recent Case, Criminal Procedure-Fourth Amendment-
Sixth Circuit Holds that "Pinging" a Target's Cell Phone to Obtain GPS Data Is not 
a Search Subject to the Warrant Requirement-United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 
772 (6th Cir. 2012), reh 'g and reh 'g en banc denied, No. 09-6497 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 
2012), 126 HARv. L. REv. 802, 806 & n.41 (2013); Jeremy H. Rothstein, Note, Track 
Me Maybe: The Fourth Amendment and the Use of Cell Phone Tracking to Facilitate 
Arrest, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 489, 494-95 (2012). 
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conspiracy. 178 After a joint FBI and D.C police team had engaged 
several other investigative techniques, the Government applied for a 
warrant to install a GPS tracking device to the undercarriage of a car 
registered to Jones's wife: 79 The application was granted, directing 
that the device be installed in D.C. and within ten days!80 The device 
was not installed, however, until eleven days after the warrant was 
issued, and it was installed in Maryland. 181 Nevertheless, the device 
was utilized, and provided information on Jones's whereabouts for a 
period of twenty-eight days because Jones was the exclusive driver of 
the vehicle. 182 Jones was later convicted, but his conviction was 
reversed by the D.C. Circuit. 183 In its opinion, the D.C. Circuit held 
that a search had occurred, predominately because the GPS device 
allowed the police to know "the whole of Jones's movements during 
the month," which the court held inimical to reasonable expectations 
of privacy. 184 In other words, the court held it might be reasonable 
for one to expect one's movements to be observed by someone else 
on one day or on a single joumey;185 however, when every movement 
is tracked over an extended period of time, that reveals the full 
picture of what the person was doing, and at that point reasonable 
expectations of privacy are invaded. 186 Scholars have termed this 
understanding of the Fourth Amendment the "mosaic theory.,,187 
On certiorari, all the Justices of the Court agreed that a search had 
occurred on the facts presented, but they were fractured as to the 
reasoning. 188 Writing for the five-Justice majority, Justice Scalia 
focused on the installation of the GPS device to the undercarriage of 
the car, an "effect" for Fourth Amendment purposes. 189 Relying on 
the property-law-based underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment, 
stretching back to the Entick case for support, the majority concluded 





183. Id. at 949. 
184. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560-61 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff'd in part sub 
nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
185. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556. 
186. !d. at 563. 
187. See Kerr, supra note 5, at 313, 320. 
188. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949, 953. 
189. Id. at 949. 
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that "[ w]e have no doubt that such a physical intrusion [of installing 
and using the GPS device] would have been considered a 'search' 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it was 
adopted.,,190 In reaching this decision, the Court resurrected the 
property-law-based approach of the Fourth Amendment espoused in 
Olmstead, and held that trespass theory provides a constitutional 
"minimum" of protection, and that the Katz test could provide a 
greater zone of protection even when information is obtained in the 
absence of a physical trespass. 191 But after reaching this narrow 
holding that a search had occurred, the Court declined to consider 
whether the search was nonetheless reasonable, or whether some 
exception to the warrant requirement applied.192 
Despite joining the majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor also wrote 
a separate concurrence that raised a number of new questions. 193 She 
indicated she agreed that, at a minimum, a physical trespass by the 
Government to obtain information will result in a search, which was 
sufficient to decide Jones's case. 194 However, she went on to signal a 
willingness to embrace some of what the proponents of the mosaic 
theory espouse, namely that "longer term GPS monitoring" might 
violate expectations of property for the investigations of "most 
offenses.,,195 She expressed concern about the use of investigative 
technologies that "generate [] a precise, comprehensive record of a 
person's public movements.,,196 Finally, recognizing that people 
often cede vast amounts of information to third parties to carry out 
everyday tasks, Justice Sotomayor hinted that "it may be necessary to 
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third 
parties." 197 
In his own concurrence, Justice Alito raised many of the concerns 
shared by Justice Sotomayor. 198 Specifically, Justice Alito noted that 
society would not consider it reasonable for the police to "secretly 
190. ld. 
191. ld. at 950,953-54. 
192. ld. at 954. 
193. Jd. at 954-55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
194. Jd. at 954. 
195. ld. at 955 (quoting id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring)). 
196. Jd. 
197. ld. at 957. 
198. See id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring). 
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monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individual's car 
for a very long period.,,199 He opined that four weeks of such 
surveillance "surely" was too long for most routine criminal 
investigations.20o However, he held out the possibility that longer 
monitoring would be permissible for investigations of certain 
"extraordinary offenses. ,,201 
So, at root, the Jones opinion decided very little, and seems to raise 
more questions than it answered. The opinion raises substantial 
issues specifically with regard to GPS tracking, generally with regard 
to new technologies, and fundamentally with regard to the Fourth 
Amendment. Given the amount of dicta and open questions in the 
Jones decision, it has naturally spawned a great deal of litigation in 
the lower courts. And as detailed below, district courts are filling in 
these gaps, often with surprising results, potentially setting up further 
review by the Supreme Court. 
III. TRIANGULATING202 THE FUTURE: EXPLORING HOW 
DISTRICT COURTS ARE ANSWERING THE QUESTIONS 
LEFT OPEN IN JONES 
In the 365 days since the Jones opinion was issued on January 23, 
2012, it has been cited by lower federal and state courts 193 times.203 
And with few exceptions, those decisions show the lower courts are 
moving cautiously, and relying on long-established doctrines and 
precedents in a way that prevents Jones from operating as a major 
realignment of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. This Part 
describes first the ways in which federal and state trial courts are 
evaluating GPS evidence in the aftermath of Jones, with an eye 
towards evaluating whether courts in fact are requiring a warrant to 




202. Triangulating refers to a method in which location information is derived from cell 
phone or GPS data. When a cell phone or GPS-enabled device is activated, it sends a 
signal to cell phone towers in the area or satellites overhead. By comparing the length 
or angle of the radio signals between several of these structures, it is possible to 
triangulate the location of the signal-emitting phone. See Who Knows Where You've 
Been? Privacy Concerns Regarding the Use o/Cellular Phones as Personal Locators, 
18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 307, 308-09 (2004). 
203. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945. 
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exceptions to the warrant requirement apply. Then, this Part goes on 
to examine Jones's effect on other technologies, including 
smartphones, pole cameras, peer to peer sharing, key fobs, and 
wireless internet networks. Finally, this Part looks at how district 
courts are evaluating the Fourth Amendment in a more general sense 
after Jones, including whether they are evaluating the Amendment 
under the now-revived property-law paradigm, or whether they are 
embracing the mosaic theory, or whether the Katz paradigm still 
reIgns supreme. 
A. Jones's Impact on the Use of GPS Tracking Information Without 
a Warrant 
As detailed above, the Supreme Court in Jones left open a number 
of questions with regard to obtaining GPS tracking evidence. 204 
Specifically, the Court declined to decide whether a warrantless 
search to obtain GPS evidence could nonetheless still be considered a 
"reasonable" search, and hence constitutional. 205 In addition, the 
Court's decision in favor of Jones raised a number of issues with 
regard to what should happen to other cases in which warrantless 
GPS evidence was already used, including who had standing to use 
Jones to contest the use of GPS evidence, whether any exception to 
the warrant requirement applied even where the defendant has 
standing, and whether the decision could apply retroactively to cases 
on collateral review.206 In the year since Jones was decided, district 
courts are answering these questions in a manner that shows a clear 
pattern of caution is emerging. 207 
The first area that district courts have evaluated is whether a 
warrantless search for GPS evidence could nonetheless still be 
reasonable. This is significant because according to its text, the 
Fourth Amendment "does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but 
only those that are unreasonable. ,,208 What is reasonable "depends on 
all of the circumstances surrounding a search or seizure and the 
nature of the search or seizure itself.,,209 As a general matter, when 
law enforcement engages in a search under the Fourth Amendment, a 
204. See supra notes 199-203 and accompanying text. 
205. See infra notes 206-23 and accompanying text. 
206. See infra notes 239-79 and accompanying text 
207. See supra Part III.A. 
208. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989). 
209. ld. (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,537 (1985)). 
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warrant is usually required.2IO However, the Court has recognized 
certain exceptions to the warrant requirement, including, when under 
the "totality of the circumstances," the search is nonetheless 
reasonable.2lI Specifically, to make the required showing of 
reasonableness, the court must balance "the degree to which [the 
search] intrudes on an individual's privacy and, ... the degree to 
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate government 
interests. ,,212 
Four lower court decisions have applied this test to GPS evidence 
post-Jones,213 and the majority-three-have found warrantless 
searches for GPS information to be reasonable.214 For example, in 
United States v. Robinson,215 the Court noted that the installation of a 
GPS tracking device on the defendant's car was "non-invasive and 
did not interfere with the operation of the vehicle" and that the agents 
"had reasonable suspicion that Robinson was engaged in criminal 
activity .... ,,216 Pursuant to the Samson balancing test, this showing 
was sufficient to permit the warrantless search.217 Furthermore, and 
importantly, the Court recognized that "[i]t may well be that in a 
future opinion the Eighth Circuit will modify its approach to the issue 
in light of Jones, but until such time," the Court will continue to 
apply prior precedents on the issue.218 This kind of caution is 
emblematic of the approach taken by lower courts in the aftermath of 
Jones.219 Following this logic and guided by a jurisprudential caution 
210. Id. 
21l. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006). 
212. Id. 
213. See, e.g., In re Application of U.S. for an Order Pursuant to Title 18, U.S. Code, 
Section 2703(d) to Disclose Subscriber Info. & Cell Site Info., 849 F. Supp. 2d. 177, 
179 (D. Mass. 2012) [hereinafter In re Application of U.S.]; United States v. Ford, 
No. I: 11-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049, at *7 (E.D. Tenn. Oct 30, 2012); United States v. 
Robinson, No. S2-4:1ICR00361AGF, 2012 WL 4893643, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 
2012); United States v. Nelson, No. CR612"'{)05, 2012 WL 3052914, at *3 (S.D. Ga. 
July 25,2012). 
214. See In re Application of U.S., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 179; Robinson, 2012 WL 4893643, 
at *1; Nelson, 2012 WL 3052914, at *3. 
215. Robinson, 2012 WL 4893643, at * 16-17. 
216. Id. at *16. These arguments echoed the arguments made by the United States in its 
brief before the Supreme Court in Jones. 
217. Id. 
218. Id. at *17. 
219. See also In re Application of U.S., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 179 ("Until either the First 
Circuit Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court rule otherwise, or Congress enacts 
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steeped in adherence to stare decisis, most lower courts to consider 
the question have concluded that the warrantless installation and 
monitoring of a GPS tracking device is "reasonable" under the Fourth 
Amendment provided the installation is minimally invasive, lasts a 
short duration, and is supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
wrongdoing. 220 
This result also makes sense in light of historical precedents. 
Simply installing a beeper device in a package that is carried on 
public roads (Knotts),22I or flying in airspace over an exposed area 
(Cira%),222 or shining a flashlight into the interior of a car 
(Brown)223 were upheld as minimally invasive searches that did not 
otherwise impair the activities of the target, but rather simply further 
exposed what would otherwise be visible to any member of the 
public should they choose to look. 224 Likewise, GPS evidence is non-
invasive, does not restrict the defendant's movements or otherwise 
impinge on the use of the vehicle, and simply reveals what could be 
learned from public observation. Thus, provided there is a showing 
that the police have some legitimate law enforcement interest in the 
target, the use of GPS tracking could be deemed reasonable post-
Jones, just as it was in Robinson. 
Relatedly, when evaluating reasonableness, district courts are also 
answering one of the questions raised by Justice Alito's concurrence: 
How long is too long? In his opinion in Jones, Justice Alito opined 
legislation dealing with the problem, the Court will follow [its previous rulings on the 
issue]."). 
220. See In re Application of U.S., 849 F. Supp. 2d at 178-79 (ho!ding that a search for 
historical cell phone tower information was reasonable where it was simply sufficient 
to satisfy the standard for an order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), i.e., the government 
must only demonstrate "specific and articulable facts" showing that there are 
"reasonable grounds" to believe the information sought is relevant to a criminal 
investigation); United States v. Nelson, No. CR612-005, 2012 WL 3052914, at *3 
(S.D. Ga. July 25,2012) (holding that officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant 
was involved in kidnappings, and hence it was reasonable for them to place GPS 
tracking device on his vehicle to gather information about his movements). But see 
United States v. Ford, No. 1:1I-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049, at *8 (B.D. Tenn. Oct. 30, 
2012) (holding that use of a GPS device was unreasonable where police used it as 
substitute for 2417 physical monitoring and used it to confirm target was perpetrator of 
string of robberies: "Both prongs of the totality of the circumstances test weigh in 
favor of applying the traditional warrant requirement to GPS tracking device cases"). 
221. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983). 
222. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207-10 (1986). 
223. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,739-40 (1983). 
224. See supra notes 144-158 and accompanying text. 
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that four weeks of GPS surveillance would "surely" be long enough 
as to constitute a search, but he stopped short of suggesting what 
precise length of time would demarcate a constitutional threshold.225 
The majority opinion chided Justice Alito for failing to support or 
elucidate further where his bright line would be.226 Notwithstanding 
this lack of specificity, or perhaps because of it, lower courts have 
been forced to respond to the dicta raised by Justice Alito's 
concurrence on this issue. Specifically, defendants are raising 
challenges in lower courts in the hopes that Justice Alito's suggestion 
about the outer marker for the length of surveillance will resonate 
with a future court.227 And while lower courts might be reluctant to 
break new ground on other issues in the absence of clearer Supreme 
Court edicts, on this issue, lower courts are actually hewing closer to 
Justice Alito's suggested framework. 228 Specifically, since Jones, 
lower courts have upheld warrantless searches of GPS data that lasted 
for "only a few hours ,,229 "under 24 hours ,,230 three days 231 four , , , 
days,232 and twelve days,233 but held that GPS tracking of seventeen 
days234 and twenty-six days235 was unconstitutional. But in another 
nod to judicial caution in this area, at least a few courts have decided 
225. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
226. Id. at 954 (majority opinion). 
227. Defendant Marquis Lopez' Reply Memorandum of Law in Support of Second Motion 
to Suppress Evidence at 1-2, United States v. Lopez, 2012 WL 3930317 (D. Del. 
Sept. 10,2012), (No. 10-67-GMS), 2012 WL 3561010; Motion to Suppress Evidence 
and Memorandum of Law at 3-4, United States v. Sereme, No. 2:11-CR-97-FtM-
29SPC, 2012 WL 1757702 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2012), (No. 2:11-CR-97-FTM-
29SPC), 2012 WL 2522104. 
228. See infra notes 229-34 and accompanying text. 
229. United States v. Wahchumwah, No. 11-30101, 2012 WL 5951624, at *3 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 27, 2012) (holding that an undercover agent's warrantless use of a concealed 
audio-video device was reasonable where it was for such a short duration). 
230. United States v. Shelburne, No. 3:11-cr-156-S, 2012 WL 2344457, at *5 (W.D. Ky. 
June 20, 2012). 
231. United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 780 (6th Cir. 2012) (distinguishing Jones 
because "[ w ]hile Jones involved intensive monitoring over a twenty-eight day period, 
here the DEA agents only tracked Skinner's cell phone for three days"). 
232. State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150, 154 (Ariz. App. 2012); see also Appellant's Opening 
Briefat *3, 2012 WL 486827 (describing facts more specifically). 
233. United States v. Sereme, No. 2:11-CR-97-FtM-29SPC, 2012 WL 1757702, at *10 
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 27, 2012). 
234. United States v. Lopez, No. 1O-cr-67(GMS), 2012 WL 3930317, at *7 (D. Del. Sept. 
10,2012). 
235. State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d 490, 496 (S.D. 2012). 
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that, absent further guidance by a majority of the Supreme Court, 
they will not pinpoint how long is too long in the first instance.236 
Looking at the constellation of these decisions, it shows some 
modest movement towards authorizing warrantless surveillance for 
more discrete periods of time, i.e. less than three weeks, before 
obtaining a warrant is indicated. Interestingly, however, no court has 
yet considered the exception floated by Justice Alito that certain 
crimes might require longer surveillance,237 such as a complex drug 
conspiracy or a price-fixing scheme, or some other criminal 
enterprise that requires a good deal of police legwork before the full 
contours of the scheme come together in a manner sufficient to make 
a charging decision. While this case may present itself in the future, 
it is arguable whether such complex investigations could be defended 
as constitutional on the argument that the very nature of these crimes 
requires longer term surveillance and evidence-gathering.238 In any 
event, while the lower courts are still moving cautiously in this area, 
the early post-Jones decisions show some movement toward the 
framework suggested by Justice Alito.239 
A second major question that district courts are confronting is 
whether, even if the installation of a GPS device is a search and an 
unreasonable one, an exception to the warrant requirement 
nonetheless still applies that prevents the exclusion of the evidence. 
Patently, the exclusion of evidence obtained through an 
unconstitutional search "is 'not a personal constitutional right,' nor is 
it designed to 'redress the injury' occasioned by an unconstitutional 
236. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 389-90 (D. Md. 2012) (holding that 
"the Fourth Amendment, as currently interpreted, does not contemplate a situation 
where government surveillance becomes a 'search' only after some specified amount 
of time"); cf Paige v. New York City Police Dept., No. 10-CV-3773 (STL)(LB), 
2012 WL 1118012, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30,2012) (holding that even "continued" 
surveillance would not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment, so long as the 
surveillance was done while the target was in public). 
237. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963-64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
238. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561~3 (\976) (holding that 
suspicionless stops were justified near a border crossing because of unique 
circumstances and challenges related to stopping crimes at that location). But see City 
of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-43 (2000) (declining to apply special 
needs exception to suspicionless roadblocks simply because law enforcement 
considered narcotics-related crime to present a "severe and intractable" problem that 
was difficult to combat). 
239. See United States v. Amaya, 853 F. Supp. 2d 818, 831 (N.D. Iowa 2012). 
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search.,,240 In fact, the Supreme Court has clarified that the "sole 
purpose" of the exclusionary rule "is to deter future Fourth 
Amendment violations.,,241 And not just any minimal or theoretical 
deterrence will suffice; there must be a fmding that suppression will 
result in "'appreciable deterrence. ",242 Pursuant to this 
understanding, the Supreme Court has endorsed a number of 
exceptions to the exclusionary rule where such deterrence will not be 
achieved by suppression, including the good faith exception, the 
independent source exception, and the inevitable discovery 
exception?43 And consistent with the notion that district courts are 
applying long-established precedents in a manner that prevents the 
Jones holding from fundamentally realigning Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the lower courts are applying these exceptions and 
refusing to exclude evidence obtained through warrantless GPS 
tracking. 244 
The post-Jones case law is legion with decisions applying the good 
faith exception to warrantless GPS surveillance. In recently 
articulating the good faith exception, the Supreme Court stated that 
"searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding 
appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule.,,245 Prior 
to Jones, four appellate courts-the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits-held that the installation and use of GPS tracking devices 
without a warrant was constitutiona1.246 Accordingly, pursuant to a 
240. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419,2426 (2011) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 486 (1976)). 
241. Id. 
242. Id. at 2426-27 (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 454 (1976)). 
243. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 142 (2009); Murray v. United States, 487 
U.S. 533, 538-39 (1988). 
244. See, e.g., United States v. Brooks, No. CRl1-2265-PhX-JAT-003, 2012 WL 
5984796, at *3 (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2012). 
245. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-24. 
246. United States v. Hernandez, 647 F.3d 216, 221 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 
994,996-99 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. McIver, 186 F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (9th 
Cir. 1999). The only circuit to hold otherwise was the D.C. Circuit. See United States 
v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 560 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
Additionally, some courts in the Eleventh Circuit have concluded that there was 
binding precedent in their circuit on this issue prior to Jones. See United States v. 
Barbary, No. 12-60011-CR, 2012 WL 4839127 at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 6, 2012). These 
courts point to the decision in United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.1981), 
which allowed the installation of a beeper onto a car. See id. at 257-59. And because 
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straightforward application of Davis, the fourteen post-Jones 
decisions from these circuits considering the exclusion of GPS 
tracking evidence have unanimously applied the good faith exception 
and declined exclusion.247 
And while the picture gets somewhat more muddled in those 
circuits where there was no binding precedent on GPS tracking pre-
Jones, the clear majority of decisions-thirteen-in those circuits 
have also applied the good faith exception.248 Indeed, even Antoine 
Fifth Circuit decisions prior to the Eleventh Circuit's split from it constitute binding 
precedent for the Eleventh Circuit, see Bonner v. Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (lith 
Cir. 1981) (en banc), these courts hold that binding precedent existed in the Eleventh 
Circuit on this issue sufficient to trigger Davis. However, because the beeper used in 
Michael was more akin to the now-antiquated beepers considered in Karo and Knotts, 
it is uncertain whether that stance will prevail. Accordingly, at the very least, we can 
say with some level of certainty that the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits had 
binding precedent pre-Jones on this issue of GPS tracking. 
247. United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 834 (5th Cir. 2013) ("Even assuming that a 
Fourth Amendment violation occurred and that suppression would otherwise be 
appropriate, the evidence should not be suppressed in this case because the officers 
acted in reasonable reliance on [then-existing] circuit precedent."); United States v. 
Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Orbegoso, No. 
CR-II-02372, 2013 WL 161194, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Jan. 15, 2013) (same); United 
States v. Guyton, No. 11-271,2013 WL 55837, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 3,2013) (same); 
United States v. Villa, No. 10-30080, 2012 WL 535210,1 at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 31, 
2012) (same); Brooks, 2012 WL 5984796 at *3 (same); United States v. Smith, No. 
2:11-cr-00058-GMN-CWH, 2012 WL 4898652, at *4-5 (D. Nev. Oct. 15, 2012) 
(same); United States v. Hardrick, No. 10-202,2012 WL 4883666 (E.D. La. Oct. 15, 
2012) (same); United States v. $22,361.83 U.S. Funds Seized from Various Accounts, 
No. CV-1I-0317-EFS, 2012 WL 1884386, at *3 (E.D. Wash. May 23, 2012) (same); 
United States v. Aquilar, No. 4:1I-cr-298-BLW, 2012 WL 1600276, at *2 (D. Idaho 
May 7, 2012) (same); United States v. Amaya, 853 F. Supp. 2d 818, 825-26 (N.D. 
Iowa Apr. 10, 2012) (same); United States v. Leon, 856 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1191-93 
(D. Haw. 2012) (same); United States v. Fata, No. 2:1I-cr-00188-RHL, 2012 WL 
1715496, at *5-6 (D. Nev. Mar. 15,2012); United States v. Nwobi, No. CRlO-952(c)-
7,2012 WL 769746, at *3-4 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2012) (same). 
248. United States v. Fisher, No. 2:10-cr-28, 2013 WL 214379, at *2-3 (W.O. Mich. Jan. 
18, 2013); United States v. Jones, No. 05-0386(ESH), 2012 WL 6443136, at *7-9 
(D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2012); United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, No. CRI1-S-424-S, 2012 
WL 6186088, at *13-14 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11,2012) (rejecting the argument that there 
must be explicit binding authority because "[s]uch cases strain at self-bred legal gnats 
to reach a conclusion that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the exclusionary rule 
require"); United Statesv. Ford, No. 1:1I-CR-42, 2012 WL 5366049, at *10-11 (E.D. 
Tenn. Oct. 30,2012); United States v. Lewis, No. 12-600l1-CR, 2012 WL 4838889, 
at *2 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 10, 2012) ("This Court is aware of no case requiring the 
Government to obtain a warrant based on the possibility that the Supreme Court might 
in the future issue an opinion abrogating existing binding circuit precedent that did not 
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Jones, who won the battle before the Supreme Court on certiorari, 
lost the war below because the district court in his case held on 
remand that the good faith exception permitted the introduction of the 
GPS evidence against him.249 These decisions take stock of the legal 
landscape as it existed when the warrantless GPS tracking was 
engaged, and because at that time there were several circuit-level 
decisions directly on point permitting warrantless GPS surveillance, 
these courts have concluded that the good faith exception applies.250 
A minority of decisions-six-have opted, however, to read Davis 
narrowly, and have held that absent binding precedent from their 
circuit directly on point with regard to GPS surveillance, the good 
faith exception cannot be applied.251 These decisions are principally 
concerned with allowing law enforcement officers in circuits that do 
not have controlling precedents to push the envelope by relying on 
other circuits that favor their predilections.252 However, as the Court 
require one."); United States v. Rose, No. 11-10062-NMG, 2012 WL 4215868, at *3-
5 (D. Mass. Sept.14, 2012); United States v. Lopez, 895 F. Supp. 2d 592, (D. Del. 
2012); United States v. Barbary, No. 12-60011-CR, 2012 WL 4839127, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla. Sept. 6,2012); United States v. Oladosu, No. 1O-056-0IS, 2012 WL 3642851, at 
*9-10 (D.R.1. Aug. 21,2012); United States v. Baez, 878 F. Supp. 2d 288, 289 (D. 
Mass. 2012) ("Where, as here, law enforcement officers at the time they act have a 
good faith basis to rely upon a substantial consensus among precedential courts, 
suppression of probative evidence is too high a price to pay because of the subsequent 
supervention of that consensus by the Supreme Court."); United States v. Shelburne, 
No. 3:11-cr-156-S, 2012 WL 2344457, at *4-6 (W.D. Ky. June 20, 2012); United 
States v. Rosas-Illescas, 872 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1326-27 (N.D. Ala. 2012); Kelly v. 
State, 208 Md. App. 218 (2012). 
249. Jones, 2012 WL 6443136, at *7-9. 
250. See, e.g., Figueroa-Cruz, 2012 WL 6186088, at *13-14 (holding that the good faith 
exception applied to warrantless use of GPS tracker because while the agents were 
tracking the defendant's car, "three Circuit Courts had expressly concluded that such 
surveillance did not implicate the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement"). 
251. United States v. Lee, 862 F. Supp. 2d 560, 571 (E.D. Ky. 2012) ("And because the 
DEA agents did not rely on binding appellate precedent, the good-faith exception 
cannot apply."); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d 515, 540-42 (E.D. Pa. 2012); 
United States v. Robinson, No. S2-4:IICR00036IAGF(DDN), 2012 WL 4893643 
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 15, 2012) (declining to apply Davis because the Eighth Circuit's 
decision in Marquez had not yet been decided when the warrantless GPS surveillance 
was employed); State v. Henry, No. II-CR-829, 2012 WL 4859072, at *3 (Ohio 
App. Oct. 12,2012); United States v. Lujan, No. 2:IICRII-SA, 2012 WL 2861546, 
at *3 (N.D. Miss. July \1, 2012); United States v. Katzin, No. 11-226, 2012 WL 
1646894, at *7-10 (E.D. Pa. May 9,2012). 
252. See, e.g., Katzin, 2012 WL 1646894, at *7-10 (declining to permit law enforcement to 
rely on "non-binding authority" to trigger the good faith exception in Davis because it 
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in Ford aptly recognized/53 the government likely has the better of 
the argument here under the strictures placed on the exclusionary rule 
by the Supreme Court in Davis.254 Specifically, the Court recognized 
in Davis that exclusion is solely about deterrence where officers 
engage in culpable conduct that violates sacrosanct rights. 255 By 
contrast, exclusion is not merited where the conduct is not 
culpable.256 And as the court in Ford recognized, it is difficult to 
describe an officer's action as culpable or deliberately reckless when 
he or she relies on the legal pronouncements of a panel of three 
circuit judges, notwithstanding that those judges are from outside the 
officer's circuit.257 To exact such a high price as exclusion in such a 
situation seems disconnected from the level of culpability. This 
calculus may likely be why the majority of lower courts apply the 
good faith exception in post-Jones cases where GPS evidence was 
obtained without a warrant. 
In addition to the good faith exception, several post-Jones decisions 
are applying the independent source exception to GPS tracking 
data.258 This exception permits evidence to be introduced if it was 
initially unlawfully seized, but later the same evidence was obtained 
by leads based on independent information that was lawfully 
obtained.259 Accordingly, in United States v. Patel/60 the Fifth 
Circuit was confronted with a situation in which a whistleblower was 
deemed to have become a government agent, and hence his 
cooperation with obtaining evidence of the defendant's mobile 
medical lab constituted an illegal search.261 Rather than consider the 
implications of Jones in this trespassory situation, the Court noted 
that there was an independent source of information that provided the 
fodder for the subsequent search warrant, which in tum meant 
exclusion was not required.262 Other decisions have also applied this 
would incentivize officers to "beg forgiveness rather than ask permission In 
ambiguous situations involving basic civil rights"). 
253. See Ford, 2012 WL 5366049 at *10-11. 
254. ld. 
255. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2423-27. 
256. ld. 
257. See 2012 WL 5366049 at *10-11. 
258. See, e.g., Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 538-39 (1988). 
259. ld. 
260. 485 Fed. Appx. 702 (5th Cir. 2012). 
261. ld. at 711. 
262. ld. 
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independent source exception to avoid applying Jones in a manner 
that results in exclusion.263 
Other courts have applied the doctrine of inevitable discovery-
which is related intellectually to the independent source exception-
to penn it the introduction of warrantless GPS tracking data. For 
example, in United States v. Orbegoso/64 the police placed a GPS 
device on the bottom of the defendant's car and obtained information 
on what banks he frequented as part of his currency smuggling 
operation.265 While the court held that the use of the GPS tracker 
without a warrant was a violation, the court noted that the officers 
were also conducting physical surveillance, and would have obtained 
the same information by visual inspection as they received through 
the GPS tracker.266 As such, the court applied the inevitable 
discovery rule and declined to exclude that evidence that the police 
would have obtained even without the GPS device.267 This result 
coincides with a number of historical Fourth Amendment rulings. 
Just as the court in Entick remarked that "the eye cannot ... be guilty 
of trespass,,,268 and the Court in Brown permitted a flashlight to 
enhance an officer's eyesight to peer into the interior of a car/69 so 
too are some district courts holding that GPS technologies are 
permitted under the inevitable discovery exception because the GPS 
evidence simply enhances the police's ability to see what they would 
otherwise be able to see with extended visual surveillance. 270 These 
263. See, e.g., Hill v. Commonwealth, No. 1828-11-3, 2012 WL 4773583, at *2-3 (Va. 
App. Oct. 9, 2012) (applying the independent source exception with regard to GPS 
tracking data obtained without a warrant). 
264. See United States v. Orbegoso, No. CR-11-02372-PHX-GMS, 2013 WL 161194 (D. 
Ariz. Jan. 15,2013). 
265. Id. at * 1. 
266. Id. at *2-4. 
267. Id. But see State v. Bone, No. 12-KA-34, 2012 WL 3968515, at *27 (La. App. Sept. 
II, 2012) (holding that the inevitable discovery rule does not apply where the 
investigating officer obtained a copy of text messages sent by defendant). 
268. See Entick v. Carrington (1765), in 19 A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS 
AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM 
THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME 1029, 1066 (T.B. Howell Esq., comp., 
1813). 
269. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739-40 (1983). 
270. See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 393-94 (D. Mass. 2010) 
("Warrantless visual surveillance or 'tailing' of [suspect's] vehicle would have been 
permissible and would have revealed to the FBI all of the same detail the GPS device 
provided, only at a much higher cost .... "). 
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precedents make the use of the inevitable discovery exception 
uniquely applicable to GPS tracking evidence obtained without a 
warrant. 
Accordingly, district courts are applying a myriad of exceptions in 
order to permit GPS information obtained without a warrant to 
nonetheless still be admitted at trial and not excluded. This further 
reinforces the notion that district courts are falling back on long-
established judicial precedents in a way that has kept Jones from 
working any cataclysmic change in the year since it was decided. 
The third major question that district courts are confronting with 
regard to GPS evidence post-Jones is whether traditional standing 
doctrines apply. As detailed above, the Supreme Court in Rakas v. 
Illinois'271 recognized that Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and 
cannot be asserted vicariously by individuals who lack an ownership 
interest in the constitutionally-protected area that was invaded.272 
And the majority opinion in Jones seemed to affirm this precedent by 
going out of its way to mention that Jones held the status of a bailee 
because he was the primary driver of his wife's car.273 Taking this 
cue from the Court, all eleven district court decisions to reach the 
issue have applied the bedrock standing rules from Rakas and 
concluded that without owning, renting, or being the exclusive user 
of the vehicle on which the GPS device was placed, that defendant 
lacks standing to raise a Fourth Amendment suppression claim 
because the search was of an area that was not constitutionally 
protected as to him.274 This reaffmnation of the standing doctrine 
271. See Rakes v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
272. ld. at 133-34. 
273. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 n.2 (2012). 
274. United States v. Martinez-Turcio, No. 10-5046, 2012 WL 4054875, at *9 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 17,2012); United States v. Shephard, No. 11-6037,2012 WL 3117513, at *5 
(6th Cir. Aug. 1, 2012); United States v. Figueroa-Cruz, No. II-S-424-S, 2012 WL 
6186088, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2012) ("Mr. Figueroa has likewise offered no 
proof of exclusivity, indicia of ownership or even an unqualified permission to use the 
[vehicle to which a tracking device was attached]."); United States v. Cannon, No. 
6:11-cr-02302-JMC-l, 2012 WL 5386045, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 1, 2012); United 
States v. Smith, No. 2:11-cr-00058-GMN-CWH, 2012 WL 4898652, at *3 (D. Nev. 
Oct. 15, 2012); Bad v. Heaney, No. 12-1589 (DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 3984550, at *1 
(D. Minn. Sept. 11,2012); United States v. Lopez, No. lO-cr-67 (GMS), 2012 WL 
3930317, at *5-6 (D. Del. Sept. 10,2012); United States v. Tan, No. CR 2:10-0262 
WBS, 2012 WL 3535887, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15,2012); United States v. Ramos, 
No. I: 11-cr-1 11-jgrn, 2012 WL 3307006, at*2 (D. Vt. Aug. 13,2012); United States 
v. Coleman, No. 3:IO-cr-238, 2012 WL 3202957, at *3-4 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2012); 
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subsequent to Jones is highly significant. This is because it will 
permit law enforcement to engage in warrantless GPS data-collection 
and use such evidence against a defendant, provided he lacks 
standing to assert a violation of his personal rights. This rule allows 
for ample use of GPS tracking to continue, even without a warrant, 
depending on who the target is and whether he has a property-Iaw-
based interest in the area to be searched. 
The fourth and fmal GPS-related question that district courts have 
been called to rule on in the aftermath of Jones is whether the 
decision applies retroactively. Patently, for cases on direct appeal, 
the defendants can tum to Jones for assistance because a defendant 
can invoke "[a] newly announced rule of substantive Fourth 
Amendment law" until his "conviction ... become[s] final on direct 
review.,,275 As such, any defendant on direct appeal may tum to 
Jones for potential arguments.276 
A different approach applies, however, for defendants seeking 
collateral review in federal court.277 The Supreme Court has held 
that, as a general matter, "new constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have become 
final before the new rules are announced.,,278 Only in those cases 
where (1) the new rule places certain individual conduct outside of 
what was previously proscribed by criminal statute, or (2) where a 
new rule fundamentally alters bedrock procedural elements, would a 
court decision have retroactive effect. 279 Applying these criteria, all 
ten court decisions to consider retroactivity have held that Jones is 
not retroactive on collateral review.280 This makes eminent sense in 
United States v. Barraza-Maldonado, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1029 (D. Minn. 2012); 
United States v. Luna-Santillanes, No. 11-20492, 2012 WL 1019601, at *7 (E.D. 
Mich. Mar. 26, 2012); United States v. Johnson, 871 F. Supp. 2d 539, 547 (W.D. La. 
2012); United States v. Hanna, No. 1I-20678-CR, 2012 WL 279435, at *4 (S.D. Fla. 
Jan. 30, 2012); State v. Estrella, 286 P.3d 150, 153 (Ariz. App. 2012). 
275. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (2011). 
276. See, e.g., State v. Bell, 366 S.W.3d 712, 713-14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (granting 
petition for discretionary review on direct appeal and remanding for consideration of 
Jones). 
277. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989); Bell, 366 S.W.3d at 713-14. 
278. Teague, 489 U.S. at 310. 
279. Id. at 310-11. 
280. United States v. Jesus-Nunez, No. 1:10-CR-017-01, 2013 WL 312387, at *7 (M.D. 
Pa. Jan. 25, 2013); Connolly v. Roden, No. 09-11987-RWZ, 2013 WL 139702, at *2 
n.3 (D. Mass. Jan. 11,2013); Reyes-Sotero v. United States, No. DKN 12-1036, DKC 
08-0593,2012 WL 6681963, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 21, 2012); Vazquez v. United States, 
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that the Court's ruling on GPS tracking was about collection of 
evidence of wrongdoing; it did not go the heart of decriminalizing an 
act itself.281 In addition, the Jones decision simply indicated a search 
occurred on the facts of that case; it did not create a new watershed 
procedural rule that was applicable going forward. 282 Accordingly, 
Jones has not been applied retroactively on collateral review, which 
further limits its reach.283 
In sum, the various opinions in Jones raised a number of questions 
with regard to evidence obtained from GPS tracking devices. 284 The 
post-Jones decisions show district courts answering those questions 
cautiously, and resorting to long-established judicial doctrines and 
precedents.285 Thus, while Jones did hold that installing and 
monitoring a GPS tracking device was a search under the Fourth 
Amendment, it might not be an unconstitutional one if the monitoring 
of the device was for a short, reasonable duration. 286 Likewise, even 
if the GPS surveillance constituted an unconstitutional search, it still 
might not lead to exclusion if the officers relied on then-existing 
No. 2:09-cv-673-FtM-29SPC, 2:08-cr-FTM-29SPC, 2012 WL 5188027, at *7-8 
(M.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2012) ("The Jones decision did not recognize a new right, and 
Jones has not been made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review."); 
Pickett v. United States, No. 12-2239 (RBK), 2012 WL 5199142 at *2-3 (D.N.J. Oct. 
18,2012); United States v. Reyes, No. 12CV555-MMA, 09CR2487-MMA, 2012 WL 
4339070, at *6-7 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 19,2012) ("Jones does not apply retroactively."); 
Bad v. Heaney, No. 12-1589{DWF/JJK), 2012 WL 3984550 (D. Minn. Sept. 11, 
2012); Garcia v. Bradt, No. 09CV7491{VB), 2012 WL 3027780, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 
23,2012); United States v. Heath, No. Cr 12-4-H-DWM, 2012 WL 1574123, at *1 
(D. Mont. May 3, 2012) ("Unfortunately for Heath, the Jones decision is not 
retroactive."); United States v. Walker, No. 09CR1533WQH, 12CV041OWQH, 2012 
WL 666794, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29,2012). 
281. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953-54 (2012). 
282. See id. 
283. See, e.g., Jesus-Nunez, 2013 WL 312387, at *7; Connolly, 2013 WL 139702, at *2 
n.3; Reyes-Soters, 2012 WL 6681963, at *3; Vazquez, 2012 WL 5188027, at *7-8; 
Pickett, 2012 WL 5199142, at *2-3; Reyes, 2012 WL 4339070, at *6-7; Bad, 2012 
WL 3984550, at *1; GarCia, 2012 WL 3027780, at *5; Heath, 2012 WL 1574123, at 
*1; Walker, 2012 WL 666794, at *2. 
284. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54; id. at 955-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 961-
62 (Alito, J., concurring). 
285. See, e.g., Jesus-Nunez, 2013 WL 312387, at *7; Connolly, 2013 WL 139702, at *2 
n.3; Reyes-Soters, 2012 WL 6681963, at *3; Vazgez, 2012 WL 5188027, at *7-8; 
Pickett, 2012 WL 5199142, at *2-3; Reyes, 2012 WL 4339070, at *6-7; Bad, 2012 
WL 3984550, at *1; Garcia, 2012 WL 3027780, at *5; Heath, 2012 WL 1574123, at 
*1; Walker, 2012 WL 666794, at *2. 
286. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954. 
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precedent, or if the officers could have obtained the same evidence 
through an independent source (such as physical, visual 
surveillance ).287 And defendants cannot even take advantage of Jones 
if they lacked standing in the area that was monitored.288 These lines 
of authority all have the net result of limiting Jones's effect on Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence, and certainly give some latitude for 
warrantlessly-obtained GPS evidence to still come into play at tria1.289 
B. Jones's Impact on the Use of Information Obtained from Other 
New Technologies 
While Jones involved the installation of a GPS tracking device to 
the undercarriage of a vehicle, this has not stopped defendants from 
attempting to apply the principles enunciated in Jones to other 
technologies and situations.29o Indeed, the dicta in some of the 
concurrences in Jones seemed to invite attempts to reconsider a 
number of longstanding principles as they applied to the Fourth 
Amendment across a wide spectrum of evidence.291 But as with the 
tracking device cases described in Part III.A above, decisions in these 
other areas also show courts moving cautiously, and declining to give 
an expansive interpretation of Jones.292 Particularly, while lower 
courts might be applying the property-law-focused test from Jones, 
and while they might note the ideas floated in the concurrences of 
Justices Sotomayor and Alito, courts have nonetheless deflected 
many Jones-based Fourth Amendment challenges where law 
enforcement obtained evidence emitted by new technologies. 293 
Verily, Jones was significant for reviving a property-law-based test 
for evaluating a potential Fourth Amendment violation.294 Because 
287. See id. at 953-54; United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983). 
288. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716, 719-20 (1984). 
289. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54; Karo, 468 U.S. at 716, 719-20; Knotts, 460 U.S. at 
284-85. 
290. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384 (2012) (applying the 
reasoning in Jones to suppress Cellular Phone Data and Historical Cell Site Location 
Data). 
291. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953-54; id. at 955-57 (Sotomayor, J., concurrence); id. at 
961-62 (Alito, 1., concurring). 
292. See supra Part lILA. 
293. See supra Part m.A.-B. 
294. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 945. 
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there was a trespass to Mr. Jones's "effect," his car, the Court held a 
search had occurred.295 
And trial courts have picked up on this "new" property-Iaw-
focused test and applied it to other new technologies. For example, 
in State v. Bailey, the court there considered whether video 
surveillance taken by the police somehow constituted a trespass onto 
the defendant's land, and hence ran afoul of Jones. 296 The court 
rejected this view because, in taking the video, "the police did not 
touch [the defendant's] property, invade [his] private space, or follow 
[him]'''297 Other lower and intennediate appellate courts have applied 
property-law tests to new Fourth Amendment challenges as well.298 
So, at the very least, Jones has spawned an additional analytical step 
in which courts must engage when evaluating a Fourth Amendment 
Issue. 
But simply applying these property-law tests to new technologies 
has not meant that more evidence has been suppressed. In fact, in the 
area of new technologies, courts have increasingly declined to hold 
that virtual or electronic trespasses result in Fourth Amendment 
violations. For example, in United States v. Skinner, the Sixth Circuit 
confronted the issue of evidence obtained from the defendant's pay-
as-you-go cell phone that emitted a GPS signal that allowed the 
location of the phone to be tracked.299 In rejecting his challenge to 
the evidence, the court relied on the fact that "[ n]o such physical 
intrusion occurred," and that the defendant himself obtained a phone 
that already had a GPS tracker installed in it when it was 
purchased.30o In recognizing that the GPS device came pre-installed, 
the case was in line with the Supreme Court's decision in Knotts, 
which recognized that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred 
295. See id. 
296. See State v. Bailey, No. 009007758, 2012 WL 3655243, at *1 (De\. Super. July 20, 
2012). 
297. Jd. 
298. See United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 241 n.23 (4th Cir. 2012) (applying Jones's 
property law analysis to the issue of whether police could search a seized shirt for 
blood sample); United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 FJd 1179, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(applying property law concepts and holding that trespass into the curtilage meant it 
was a search); Gilbert v. State, No. 58240,2012 WL 5378174, at *1-2 (Nev. Oct. 31, 
2012) (applying property law concepts enunciated in Jones to surveillance of open 
fields on ranch lands). 
299. See United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 774 (6th Cir. 2012). 
300. Jd. at 780. 
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when a tracking device was implanted by a third party prior to 
purchase by the defendant.30l This holding goes right to the point 
made by Justice Alito in his concurrence in Jones in which he noted 
that the majority's trespassory test would have little utility in the era 
of smartphones, which already come equipped with GPS devices.302 
Accordingly, Skinner shows that because the Supreme Court's 
decision in Jones turned on the initial trespass, its reach has been 
muted in the area of smartphones, which already have GPS 
technology and for which no trespass is needed to install the GPS 
system.303 
A similar result has been reached with regard to the use of pole 
camera surveillance. For instance, in United States v. Nowka,304 ATF 
agents had a third-party utility company install a camera on the utility 
pole immediately adjacent to the defendant's property.305 The camera 
was trained on the defendant's driveway, and showed him placing 
several firearms into his car, which evidence was later used to obtain 
a search warrant in an investigation into unlicensed firearms sales. 306 
In rejecting the defendant's motion to suppress based on Jones, the 
court recognized that "there was no physical trespass when the 
camera was attached to the pole," and the camera only showed 
images that anyone could see standing on the sidewalk, and hence the 
camera evidence was not unlawfully obtained.307 Similar results were 
reached in United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw,308 and United States 
v. Brooks.309 In both cases, the courts rejected challenges to pole 
cameras that had been installed adjacent to where the defendants 
301. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 279-80 (1983). 
302. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 962-63 (2012). 
303. But see Commonwealth v. Pitt, No. 2010-0061, 2012 WL 927095 at *6-10 (Mass. 
Super. Feb. 23, 2012) (holding that even though smartphone contained a GPS tracker, 
obtaining defendant's location information still required a warrant because the 
technology provides "a window into the most private dimensions of [ our] lives"). 
304. United States v. Nowka, No. 5:11-cr-00474-VEH-HGD, 2012 WL 2862139, at *4 
(N.D. Ala. May 14,2012). 
305. Jd. at *4-5. 
306. See id. 
307. ld. at *4. 
308. United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw, No. 1:11-CR-257, 2012 WL 774964 (N.D. Ohio 
Mar. 8, 2012). 
309. United States v. Brooks, No. CR-1l-2265-PHX-JAT--003, 2012 WL 5984804 (D. 
Ariz. Nov. 28, 2012). 
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lived because no trespass had occurred during the installation. 310 
However, what is significant here is that these courts also considered 
arguments made by the defendants that echoed the arguments by 
Justices Sotomayor and Alito that, at some point, 2417 surveillance 
might be so pervasive that it triggers Fourth Amendment concems.3l1 
Emblematic of the caution being taken by district courts in this area, 
both courts declined to read the tea leaves about what the Court might 
do in a future case based on the dicta in the concurrences.3I2 As such, 
just like smartphone GPS tracking, the questions raised in Jones have 
not resulted in pole camera evidence being suppressed so far. 
Likewise, district courts have continued to uphold investigative 
techniques where agents access peer-to-peer network shared files. 313 
For example, in United States v. Brooks,3J4 the defendant had a closed 
peer-to-peer file-sharing network set up, which allowed him to accept 
"friend" requests and share files from his network with those friends 
to whom he allowed access.315 After he accepted a friend request 
from an undercover agent, the agent was able to access certain files 
on the defendant's network that contained child pomography.3J6 In 
the defendant's motion to suppress, he raised Jones and held that the 
agent committed an electronic trespass to his network files.317 The 
court rejected this argument and held that "'merely the transmission 
of electronic signals'" did not result in an unlawful trespass. 318 At 
least one other court has reached a similar result and rejected the 
argument that an undercover agent commits a virtual trespass by 
310. Brooks, 2012 WL 5984804, at *1, *4-7; Anderson-Bagshaw, 2012 WL 774964, at *1, 
*3. 
311. See Brooks, 2012 WL 5984804, at *4-6 (citing United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 
962-64 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)); Anderson-Bagshaw, 2012 WL 774964, at *2. 
312. Brooks, 2012 WL 5984804, at *5-6; Anderson-Bagshaw, 2012 WL 774964, at *2. 
313. See United States v. Brooks, No. 12-CR-166 (RRM), 2012 WL 6562947 (E.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 17,2012); United States v. Nolan, No. I:IICR 82 CEl., 2012 WL 1192183, at 
*10-11 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 6, 2012) (Report and Recommendation), adopted by United 
States v. Nolan, no. l:ll-CR-82 CEJ, 2012 WL 1192757, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9, 
2012). 
314. 2012 WL 6562947. 
315. Id.at*1. 
316. Id. 
317. Id. at *1-2, 5. 
318. Id. at *5 (quoting United States v. Jones, S. Ct. 945,953 (2012)). 
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accessing files on a peer-to-peer network to which he was gIVen 
access by the defendant. 3\9 
In a similar vein, courts have declined to suppress evidence 
obtained by the use of electronic "key fobs.,,320 Key fobs are 
electronic devices that send a signal to a particular vehicle and allow 
the vehicle to be unlocked or to set off the car's theft alarm.321 In 
United States v. Cowan,322 officers executed a search warrant on the 
defendant's home, and during a protective pat-down they felt a set of 
keys and a key fob in the defendant's pocket. 323 The officers 
subsequently pressed the alann button on the key fob in order to 
determine if the defendant's vehicle was located outside.324 In 
rejecting the defendant's suppression argument, the court declined to 
hold that merely sending the electronic signals from the fob resulted 
in a trespass to the vehicle.325 A similar result was reached in Nunley 
v. State in which an officer pressed a key fob's remote door-lock 
button: the court held that "[t]he act of transmitting the electronic 
signal from the key to the car did not constitute a trespass.,,326 These 
and other cases involving key fobs show courts declining to extend 
Jones's trespassory test to the extreme and to the virtual.327 Rather, 
these courts recognize that electronic "trespasses" using key fobs 
should not automatically result in suppression.328 
319. Nolan, 2012 WL 1192183 at * 10-11, adopted by United States v. Nolan, No. 1:11-
CR-82 CEl, 2012 WL 1192757, at * I (E.D. Mo. Apr. 9,2012). 
320. See United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947, 952-57 (8th Cir. 2012); Nunley v. State, 
No. 05-11-01066-CR, 2012 WL 6035512, at *2-3 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2012); 
Wiley v. State, No. 01-11-00147-CR, 2012 WL 3773293, at *9-10 (Tex. Ct. App. 
Aug. 30,2012). 
321. Cowan, 674 F.3d at 951; Wiley, 2012 WL 3773293, at *9. 
322. United States v. Cowan, 674 F.3d 947 (8th Cir. 2012). 
323. Id. at 951. 
324. /d. 
325. [d. at 955-57. Alternatively, the court held that even if the use of the fob was a 
search, it was justified by the automobile exception. [d. 
326. Nunley v. State, 2012 WL 6035512 at *2-3. 
327. See, e.g., Wiley v. State, No. 01-ll-00157-CR, 2012 WL 3773293 at *9-10 (Tex. 
App. Aug. 30, 2012) (holding that use of car alarm button did not violate defendant's 
Fourth Amendment rights). 
328. See supra notes 322-327. 
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Wireless networks provide an additional example of where courts 
are being asked to outline the limits of Jones. 329 Wireless network 
routers emit radio signals that permit a user in one's home or business 
to access the internet without requiring the computer to be physically 
attached to an ethernet cable and cable router.330 While these systems 
are convenient, they have the downside of being vulnerable to 
hackers and intrusion from the outside. 331 In addition, as a simple 
factual matter, the networks often broadcast radio signals that 
broadcast to everyone in the vicinity that the user has a wireless 
network set Up.332 This dynamic came to a head in United States v. 
Ahrndt.333 In that case, a neighbor of the defendant obtained access to 
the internet through the defendant's nearby wireless connection. 334 
However, when the neighbor did so, the neighbor got access to a 
shared library the defendant had created on iTunes, which contained 
images of child pornography.335 After the neighbor alerted police, an 
officer asked the neighbor to repeat for him how the neighbor 
accessed the defendant's network, which in tum led the officer to 
obtain a search warrant.336 In denying the defendant's motion to 
suppress, the district court held that by using a wireless network that 
was unsecured, the defendant had essentially broadcast his files to 
anyone in the public who might care to see.337 In reaching this 
decision, the court was echoing the holding in Olmstead that the use 
of telephone lines had the result of magnifying one's voice to the 
outside world.338 While the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for 
329. See Wi-Fi, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (2013), available at http:// 
www.britannica.comlEBcheckeditopicI1473553IWi-Fi (explaining how wireless 
networks function). 
330. See WLAN, in Glossary, WI-FI ALLIANCE, http://www.wi-fi.orglknowledge-center/ 
glossary (last visited May 23,2013). 
33 J. See Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and 
Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 
373-75 (2010). 
332. See supra notes 329-30. 
333. United States v. Ahrndt, 475 Fed. App'x. 656 (9th Cir. 2012). 
334. Id. at 657. 
335. Id. 
336. Id. 
337. See United States v. Ahrndt, No. 08-468-Kl, 2010 WL 373994, at *5 (D. Or. Jan 28, 
2010) rev'd, 475 F. App'x 656 (9th Cir. 2012). 
338. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overroled by Katz v. 
United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) 
("The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument 
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further fact-finding,339 the decision shows once again that lower 
courts are not employing Jones to suppress evidence based on the 
electronic or virtual trespasses. 
What undergirds these decisions is the long-established third-party 
doctrine recognized in United States v. Miller. 340 This doctrine holds 
that individuals lose a reasonable expectation in privacy information 
they voluntarily share with a third-party who may give that 
information up to the government. 341 And notwithstanding the fact 
that Justice Sotomayor in Jones suggested that it might be time to 
reassess the validity of the third-party doctrine in this electronic age 
of data-sharing with third parties,342 numerous post-Jones decisions 
have applied the third-party doctrine to permit law enforcement to 
obtain historical cell phone location data,343 text messages,344 
tweets/45 and telephone numbers dialed and calls received346 because 
they all were shared with third-party communication providers in 
transmISSIon. In reaching these decisions, these courts have 
recognized Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, but have concluded that 
"Justice Sotomayor's potential willingness to reconsider the third 
party doctrine says very little about how the Supreme Court as a 
with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside, and that the 
wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over them, are not within the 
protection of the Fourth Amendment."). 
339. 475 Fed. App'x. at 658. 
340. 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
341. Id. at 443. 
342. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
343. See United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384,398-403 (D. Md. 2012) (declining 
to reconsider third-party doctrine where agents had sought historical cell phone 
location data because "unless and until the Supreme Court affirmatively revisits the 
third-party doctrine the law is [still the same under Miller],,). Accord United States v. 
Madison, No. 11-60285-CR, 2012 WL 3095357, at *8-10 & n.1O (S.D. Fla. July 30, 
2012). 
344. State v. Roden, 279 P.3d 461,464-66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2012). But see State v. Patino, 
No. PI-IO-1155A, 2012 WL 3886269 (Super. Ct. R.I. Sept. 4, 2012) (holding that 
defendant retained privacy interest in text messages); Roden, 279 P.3d at 472-74 (Van 
Deren, J., dissenting) (stating that third-party doctrine should not apply given the 
reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages). 
345. People v. Harris, 949 N.Y.S.2d 590, 593-96 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2012) (rejecting 
defendant's reliance on Justice Sotomayor's concurrence and holding that tweets 
constitute "[P]ublication to third parties," and hence there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy). 
346. United States v. Gomez, No. 10-321, 2012 WL 3844370, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5, 
2012). 
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whole would view such a challenge, and certainly does not give a 
district court much comfort in making a decision that would directly 
conflict with long-established Supreme Court precedent.,,347 This 
stance is emblematic of the caution with which district courts have 
approached these issues involving new technologies. 
So, while Jones raised a number of questions that defendants have 
used to mount challenges to evidence collected by law enforcement 
from the use of new technologies, subsequent decision-making has 
not led to widespread or even consistent suppression. Perhaps as a 
result of the fact that the majority in Jones rested on a trespass-based 
theory and not upon any of the more far-reaching notions mentioned 
in the two concurrences, district courts have largely declined to break 
new Fourth Amendment ground where novel technologies are 
concerned. These courts have declined to give expansive 
interpretations to Jones by declining to hold that every virtual or 
electronic intrusion into a new technology might be a "trespass" that 
results in a search.348 Likewise, these courts have continued to apply 
the third-party doctrine enunciated in Miller. 349 And as a result, the 
post-Jones Fourth Amendment jurisprudence looks much the same as 
it did before. 
C. Jones's Impact on the Fourth Amendment Generally 
As detailed above, when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Jones, there was much anticipation that the Court might embrace the 
mosaic theory suggested by the D.C. Circuit's decision in 
Maynard. 350 And between the concurrences of Justices Sotomayor 
and Alito, it appears that five Justices might be open to such a new 
rule. 351 However, while raising the question, a majority of the Court 
did not decide it. 
And as with the other questions raised by Jones, district courts have 
declined to adopt such an understanding in the absence of a more 
defmitive embrace by a majority of the Court. For example, in 
United States v. Graham, the court recognized that the Jones majority 
did not reach the issue of the mosaic theory.352 The court furthermore 
347. Id. 
348. See supra notes 292-339. 
349. See supra notes 125-132,342-45 and accompanying text. 
350. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text. 
351. See supra notes 8-18 and accompanying text. 
352. United States v. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d 384, 401 (D. Md. 2012). 
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noted the "problematic" consequences of adopting a mosaic theory 
test, including how it would penalize law enforcement for being 
thorough and engaging in infonnation-gathering techniques, which 
would be permissible in isolation.353 After considering the difficulties 
involved with applying such a theory, the district court in Graham 
held that "[ u ]ntil the Supreme Court or the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit defmitively conclude that an 
aggregation of surveillance records infringes a Fourth Amendment 
legitimate expectation of privacy, this Court must apply the facts of 
this case to the law as currently interpreted.,,354 A number of other 
district courts have followed suit and declined to adopt a mosaic 
theory approach to the Fourth Amendment.355 
Accordingly, the Jones decision has not ushered in a general 
realignment of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, at least not yet. 
Perhaps such a realignment in the area of emerging technologies will 
have to wait for legislative action. Specifically, in his concurrence, 
Justice Alito suggested that legislation in this area would be merited 
and perhaps the best way forward. 356 At least one district court has 
joined in that call, by stating that "if the arc of technological 
improvement (or the implementation of that technology by the 
government) should be altered in a way that does infringe a person's 
legitimate expectation of privacy, the solution is properly for the 
legislature to address.,,357 And it would not be unprecedented for the 
legislature to take such action.358 After the Court decided Olmstead, 
Congress passed the Federal Communications Act of 1934.359 
353. Id. at 401--03. 
354. Id. at 394. 
355. United States v. Brooks, No. CR 11-2265-PHX-JAT-003, 2012 WL 5984804, at *5-6 
(D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2012) (declining to adopt mosaic theory); United States v. 
Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI, 2012 WL 5208173, at *7 (D. Or. Oct. 22, 2012) 
(applying the standard enunciated in Smith); United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw, No. 
l:ll-CR-257, 2012 WL 774964, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 8, 2012). But see 
Commonwealth v. Wyatt, No. 2011-00693, 2012 WL 4815307, at *7 (Mass. Super. 
Aug. 7, 2012) (suggesting the mosaic theory should apply with regard to historical 
cell data); Montana State Fund v. Simms, 270 P.3d 64, 69-70 (Mont. 2012) (Nelson, 
J., specially concurring) (suggesting that the mosaic theory should apply to public 
camera surveillance). 
356. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 964 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
357. Graham, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 390. 
358. See supra notes 103-105, 124 and accompanying text. 
359. See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text. 
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Likewise, after the Katz decision, Congress passed Title III. 360 What 
this history has shown is that when Congress acts in this manner, it 
sets clear ground rules that law enforcement can understand and 
follow, and that courts can easily apply. And given that Congress is 
accountable to the people through the democratic processes, any 
legislation passed should likely have popular legitimacy, and be 
subject to further amendment should the need arise. 
So, it remains to be seen whether the mosaic theory will ever get a 
definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, or whether the Court 
desires to usher in a new paradigm when it comes to the Fourth 
Amendment. Rather, at least for now, any realignment of the Fourth 
Amendment and its protections in the area of new technologies may 
have to come from the federal and state legislatures and not from the 
courts. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment protects some of our most important and 
sacrosanct rights as American citizens. As a Nation, we were born 
out of a search for liberty, freedom, and independence from the 
British Crown. In reaction to the abuses of general warrants and 
writs of assistance, the Framers adopted a Fourth Amendment that 
guaranteed each of us certain rights against unreasonable searches 
and seizures. And while the Supreme Court has continued to 
safeguard these rights amidst advancing technologies-from the 
advent of the telephone, to the invention of the flashlight, to the use 
of thermal imagers, and now to the use of GPS trackers-new 
challenges have arisen with regard to how we understand and apply 
the Fourth Amendment to modem times. 
Jones represented an opportunity for the Court to make a far-
reaching change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. But instead of 
fundamentally making new constitutional ground, the Court in Jones 
revived a property-law-based approach to the Fourth Amendment, 
and grafted a new/old test onto the Katz test that had reigned for the 
past thirty years. But while the Court revived property-law theory to 
fmd there was a search, it did not decide much else. In fact, while a 
number of Justices suggested they would be ready to reconsider 
certain bedrock principles, they declined to do so as a majority in 
Jones. 
360. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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As a result, district courts left to answer the issues raised by the 
various opinions in Jones have responded with caution. Rather than 
fly headlong into uncharted territory, district court have applied long-
standing precedents to deal with the new challenges raised by new 
technologies. Consequently, while Jones might signal changes on the 
horizon, a year's worth of post-Jones data shows that widespread 
change has not yet come. Thus, while Jones might not have been the 
harbinger of change it was hyped to be, it will take a future case to 
see if it was the start of a wholly new chapter in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
